“Sharing Nicely”: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production by Benkler, Yochai
Essay 
Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and 







I. CASE STUDIES: CARPOOLING AND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING .......... 281 
A. Carpools............................................ 281 
B. Distributed Computing ........... ............................. 289 
II. LUMPINESS, GRANULARITY, AND SHAREABLE GOODS ............ 296 
A. Renewable Resources........................ 
..................................... 
298 
B. Rapidly Decaying Resources ........................ ................ 300 
C. Lumpiness in General 
............................................................. 
301 
D. Shareable Goods: Conclusion 
................ 
....................... 304 
III. SHARING AND MARKETS: TRANSACTION COSTS AND MOTIVATIONS ... 305 
A. Transaction Costs ............. 
.................................. 
306 
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I owe thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Bob 
Ellickson, Dan Kahan, Al Klevorick, Michael Levine, Orly Lobel, Daniel Markovits, Richard 
McAdams, Robert Post, Judith Resnik, Carol Rose, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Jed Rubenfeld, Alan 
Schwartz, Henry Smith, and Jim Whitman, who read prior versions of this Essay and provided 
helpful comments. 
273 
274 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
1. Choosing a Transactional Framework............................. 306 
2. The General Shape of Transaction-Costs-Based Choice 
Among Frameworks ........................................ 310 
3. Transaction Costs Analysis of Markets and Sharing........ 315 
a. Crispness.......... ................................ 315 
b. Rendering Requirements and Lossiness.............. 318 
c. Decentralized Systems and Information ...................... 320 
B . M otivation ................................... ............................ ... 321 
C. Motivation and Information ........................... ............ 328 
IV. SHARING AS A MODALITY OF PRODUCTION ................................ 330 
A. Sharing Is a Common and Underappreciated Modality 
of Production ................................... 332 
B. Sharing Is Sensitive to Technology Because Individual 
Efficacy Is Subject to Physical-Capital Constraints .............. 339 
C. Decentralized, Loosely Coupled Social Sharing Is an 
Economically Attractive Modality of Production .................. 342 
V. SOME CURRENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS ..................................... 344 
A. Wireless Communications Regulation ..................................... 344 
B. Information, Knowledge, and Cultural Production Policy.......... 348 
C. Network Design for a Network of Shareable Goods ................. 353 
CONCLUSION ......... 
.................... 
................... ... 356 
2004] Sharing Nicely 275 
INTRODUCTION 
The world's fastest supercomputer and the second-largest commuter 
transportation system in the United States function on a resource- 
management model that is not well specified in contemporary economics. 
Both SETI@home, a distributed computing platform involving the 
computers of over four million volunteers, and carpooling, which accounts 
for roughly one-sixth of commuting trips in the United States, rely on social 
relations and an ethic of sharing, rather than on a price system, to mobilize 
and allocate resources. Yet they coexist with, and outperform, price-based 
and government-funded systems that offer substitutable functionality. 
Neither practice involves public goods, network goods, or any other 
currently defined category of economically "quirky" goods as either inputs 
or outputs. PCs and automobiles are privately owned, rival goods, with no 
obvious demand-side positive returns to scale when used for distributed 
computing or carpooling.1 The sharing practices that have evolved around 
them are not limited to tightly knit communities of repeat players who 
know each other well and interact across many contexts. They represent 
instances where social sharing2 is either utterly impersonal or occurs among 
1. Computers as communications devices do have demand-side returns to scale, or network 
externalities. But as processing units, the paramount value of personal computers is the intrinsic 
value of their computation speed and memory, not the network externalities they enable owners to 
capture. SETI@home and other distributed computing projects harness these intrinsic-value 
aspects of personal computers rather than their capacities as communication devices. 
2. "Sharing" is an uncommon usage in the economics literature, though it is common in some 
of the anthropology literature. I choose it because it is broader in its application than other, more 
common, but narrower terms for associated phenomena-most importantly, "reciprocity" or 
"gift." I hesitate to use "reciprocity" because of its focus on more or less directly responsive 
reciprocated reward and punishment as a mechanism to sustain cooperation in the teeth of the 
standard assumptions about collective action. See DAN M. KAHAN, THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: 
TRUST, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LAW (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 31 & 
Yale Program for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 281, 2002), available 
at http://ssm.com/abstract=361400. Given the presence of purely redistributive practices like 
tolerated theft and demand sharing in the anthropology literature, see infra notes 86-87 and 
accompanying text, evidence of nonreciprocal pro-social behavior, see BRUNO S. FREY & 
STEPHAN MEIER, PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, RECIPROCITY, OR BOTH? (Inst. for Empirical Research 
in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 107, 2002), and more generally our intuitive 
experiences of acts of humanity toward others whom we will never encounter again, I suspect that 
some forms of redistribution are nonreciprocal except in the broadest sense of the reciprocation of 
living in a humane society. Mutual aid and cooperation without the possibility of reciprocal 
exchange likely exists, the "Lion and the Mouse" fable notwithstanding. See, e.g., James 
Woodburn, 'Sharing Is Not a Form of Exchange': An Analysis ofProperty-Sharing in Immediate- 
Return Hunter-Gatherer Societies, in PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 48 (C.M. Hann ed., 1998). I hesitate to use the term "gift 
exchange" because the highly developed gift literature, see infra note 6, has focused very heavily 
on the production and reproduction of social relations through the exchange and circulation of 
things. As will soon become clear, I am concerned with the production of things and 
actions/services valued materially, through nonmarket mechanisms of social sharing. "Sharing," 
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loosely affiliated individuals who engage in social practices that involve 
contributions of the capacity of their private goods in patterns that combine 
to form large-scale and effective systems for provisioning goods, services, 
and resources. 
This Essay seeks to do two things. The first three Parts are dedicated to 
defining a particular class of physical goods as "shareable goods" that 
systematically have excess capacity and to combining comparative 
transaction costs and motivation analysis to suggest that this excess 
capacity may better be harnessed through sharing relations than through 
secondary markets. These first three Parts extend the analysis I have 
performed elsewhere regarding sharing of creative labor, like free software 
and other peer production,3 to the domain of sharing rival material 
resources in the production of both rival and nonrival goods and services. 
The characteristics I use to define shareable goods are sufficient to make 
social sharing and exchange of material goods feasible as a sustainable 
social practice. But these characteristics are neither absolutely necessary 
nor sufficient for sharing to occur. Instead, they define conditions under 
which, when goods with these characteristics are prevalent in the physical- 
capital base of an economy, it becomes feasible for social sharing and 
exchange to become more salient in the overall mix of relations of 
production in that economy. The fourth Part is then dedicated to explaining 
how my observation about shareable goods in the domain of physical goods 
meshes with the literature on social norms, social capital, and common 
property regimes, as well as with my own work on peer production. I 
suggest that social sharing and exchange is an underappreciated modality of 
economic production, alongside price-based and firm-based market 
production and state-based production,4 whose salience in the economy is 
sensitive to technological conditions. The last Part explores how the 
recognition of shareable goods and sharing as a modality of economic 
production can inform policy. 
Shareable goods are goods that are (1) technically "lumpy" and (2) of 
"mid-grained" granularity. By "lumpy" I mean that they provision 
then, offers a less freighted name for evaluating mechanisms of social-relations-based economic 
production. 
3. Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 
369 (2002). 
4. In this, my position tracks the tripartite mapping of the universe of organizational forms 
that resulted from the work on nonprofits in the early 1980s. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT 
ECONOMY 1-15 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS: TUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 3, 3-17 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
Unlike the nonprofit literature, my focus is not within the boundaries of firms-whether for- or 
nonprofit-but on sharing among individuals in informal associations more resembling markets in 
the price-based economy than firms. 
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functionality in discrete packages rather than in a smooth flow. A PC is 
"lumpy" in that you cannot buy less than some threshold computation 
capacity, but once you have provisioned it, you have at a minimum a 
certain amount of computation, whether you need all of it or not. By 
"granularity" I seek to capture (1) technical characteristics of the 
functionality-producing goods, (2) the shape of demand for the 
functionality in a given society, and (3) the amount and distribution of 
wealth in that society. A particular alignment of these characteristics will 
make some goods or resources "mid-grained," by which I mean that there 
will be relatively widespread private ownership of these goods and that 
these privately owned goods will systematically exhibit slack capacity 
relative to the demand of their owners. A steam engine is large grained and 
lumpy. An automobile or PC is mid-grained in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan, but large grained in Bangladesh. Reallocating the slack capacity 
of mid-grained goods-say, excess computer cycles or car seats going from 
A to B-becomes the problem whose solution can be provided by 
secondary markets, sharing, or management. I offer reasons to think that 
sharing may have lower transaction costs, improve the information on 
which agents who own these resources act, and provide better motivation 
for clearing excess capacity. While economists might prefer to call these 
goods "indivisible" rather than "lumpy," that terminology is less intuitive to 
non-economists, and, more importantly, it emphasizes a concern with how 
best to price capacity that is indivisible and coarsely correlated to demand, 
glossing over the way in which the granularity affects the pattern of 
distribution of investment in these goods in society. My own concern is 
how a particular subclass of indivisible goods-those that are mid-grained 
as I define them here-creates a feasibility space for social sharing rather 
than requiring a particular model of second-best pricing. While 
indivisibilities do create challenges for efficient pricing, in my analysis they 
create conditions in which social relations may provide a more efficient 
transactional framework to provision and exchange those goods than would 
the price system. 
In particular, both markets and managerial hierarchies require crisp 
specification of behaviors and outcomes. Crispness is costly. It is not a 
characteristic of social relations, which rely on fuzzier definitions of 
actions required and performed, of inputs and outputs, and of obligations. 
Furthermore, where uncertainty is resistant to cost-effective reduction, the 
more textured (though less computable) information typical of social 
relations can provide better reasons for action than the persistent (though 
futile) search for crisply computable courses of action represented by 
pricing or managerial commands. Moreover, social sharing can capture a 
cluster of social and psychological motivations that are not continuous 
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with, and may even be crowded out by, the presence of money. Pooling 
large numbers of small-scale contributions to achieve effective 
functionality-where transaction costs would be high and per- 
contribution payments must be kept low-is likely to be achieved more 
efficiently through social sharing systems than through market-based 
systems. It is precisely this form of sharing-on a large scale, among 
weakly connected participants, in project-specific or even ad hoc 
contexts-that we are beginning to see more of on the Internet; that is my 
central focus. 
Social sharing and exchange is becoming a common modality of 
producing valuable desiderata at the very core of the most advanced 
economies-in information, culture, education, computation, and 
communications sectors. Free software, distributed computing, ad hoc mesh 
wireless networks, and other forms of peer production offer clear examples 
of such large-scale, measurably effective sharing practices. I suggest that 
the highly distributed capital structure5 of contemporary communications 
and computation systems is largely responsible for the increased salience of 
social sharing as a modality of economic production in those environments. 
By lowering the capital costs required for effective individual action, these 
technologies have allowed various provisioning problems to be structured 
in forms amenable to decentralized production based on social relations, 
rather than through markets or hierarchies. 
My claim is not, of course, that we live in a unique moment of 
humanistic sharing. It is, rather, that our own moment in history suggests 
a more general observation: that the technological state of a society, 
particularly the extent to which individual agents can engage in 
efficacious production activities with material resources under their 
individual control, affects the opportunities for, and hence the 
comparative prevalence and salience of, social, market (both price based 
and managerial), and state production modalities. The capital cost of 
effective economic action in the industrial economy shunted sharing to its 
peripheries-to households in the advanced economies, and to the global 
economic peripheries that have been the subject of the anthropology of 
gift or common property regime literatures. The emerging restructuring of 
capital investment in digital networks-in particular the phenomenon of 
user-capitalized computation and communications capabilities-is at least 
partly reversing that effect. Technology does not determine the level of 
5. This is different from capital intensity. The activity may be capital intensive-like 
distributed computing-when you consider the total capital cost of the computers, network 
connections, etc. required for an effective unit of production, in comparison to the cost of labor 
involved. The capital is, however, highly distributed, which is the key characteristic that enables 
individual agency in the production process. 
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sharing. But it does set threshold constraints on the effective domain of 
sharing as a modality of economic production. Within the domain of the 
feasible, the actual level of sharing practices will be culturally driven and 
cross-culturally diverse. 
As the case studies in Part I will underscore, the loose category of 
"social sharing" that I employ here covers a broad range of social 
phenomena. Carpooling can largely, though not exclusively, be explained in 
terms of instrumental exchange. Distributed computing projects look like 
cases of mass altruism among strangers. What justifies bringing such 
diverse practices under one umbrella term is that they are instances of 
productive cooperation that are based neither on the price system nor on 
managerial commands. Given the focus of current policy debates on 
improving the institutional conditions for market-based production of 
various desiderata, even at the expense of substitutable social practices, it 
becomes important to recognize the presence, sustainability, and relative 
efficiency of even a loosely defined broad alternative. 
Once we come to accept the economic significance of this cluster of 
social practices, we will have to turn to mapping internal variations and 
understanding their workings and relationships to each other as economic 
phenomena. Even from the relatively limited review I offer here, it is clear 
that social production covers different forms of motivation and 
organization. There are instrumental and noninstrumental motivations. 
Instrumental motivations may, in turn, be material-the primary focus of 
the social norms, social capital, and common property regimes literatures- 
or social-relational-that is, focused on the production of relations of power 
within a society, a focus that has been central to the literature on the gift.6 
The gift literature, however, has meshed the instrumental production of 
social relations with the noninstrumental, mystical or religious nature of gift 
giving. This noninstrumental form of motivation-though from a very 
nonmystical perspective-has also been the focus of the psychological 
literature on motivation crowding out that I discuss in Section III.B. 
Understanding how the motivational and organizational forms of this 
6. The anthropological literature on sharing and the gift has been vast, starting with 
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC (1922), and MARCEL MAUSS, 
THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (Ian Cunnison trans., 
Free Press 1954) (1925). A combination of a broad intellectual history and a major contemporary 
contribution to this line is MAURICE GODELIER, THE ENIGMA OF THE GIFT (Nora Scott trans., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1999) (1996). See also James G. Carrier, Property and Social Relations in 
Melanesian Anthropology, in PROPERTY RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 85, 85-97 (providing brief 
intellectual history of the literature); C.M. Hann, Introduction: The Emrbeddness of Property, in 
PROPERTY RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 1, 23-34 (same). As an alternative antithesis to the 
competition-of-all-against-all model of human society, an early manifestation of a focus on 
mutual aid and cooperation as a possible path for contemporary societies was PETR KROPOTKIN, 
MUTUAL AID: A FACTOR OF EVOLUTION (Extending Horizons Books 1955) (1902). 
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modality operate will be important whether one seeks to engage in 
institutional design that takes into consideration the presence of social 
production as a potential source of welfare, or whether one is concerned 
with building a business model that harnesses the power of social 
production-be it for profit, like IBM's relationship with the GNU/Linux 
development community, or nonprofit, like NASA's relationship with the 
contributors to SETI@home. For now, however, all we need is to recognize 
that a broad set of social practices can be sustainable and efficient 
substitutes for markets, firms, and bureaucracies. 
The policy implications of recognizing the relative importance of 
sharing-based solutions to economic problems are significant. As we 
manage the transition to a networked information economy, we face 
diverse questions regarding how best to regulate different areas of this 
economy: How should we regulate wireless communications systems? 
How should we regulate music distribution? Should we regulate the 
design of computers to assure that they are not used to access cultural 
products without authorization? Usually these policy debates, to the 
extent they are concerned with efficiency and welfare, assume that the 
role of policy is to optimize the institutional conditions of attaching prices 
to marginal actions so as to permit the price system to be the dominant 
modality of production. This may or may not be wise, but whether it is or 
is not can only be examined thoughtfully once we have a full picture of 
the alternatives. If we believe that there are only two alternatives-the 
price system and some form of hierarchy-we have a very different 
policy-choice space than if we believe that there is a third modality of 
production open to us, social production, that may under certain 
conditions be more efficient. 
Radio and communications technologies have reached a point where 
our policy focus is changing. The Federal Communications Commission is 
creating an institutional framework to facilitate markets in shareable 
goods-unlicensed wireless devices and systems-that co-produce wireless 
transport capacity. Originally, using such devices was prohibited in order to 
make the world safe for large-grained systems, like broadcast towers or 
cellular networks, that deliver wireless services based on either the terms of 
a government license or markets in "spectrum." The music copyright debate 
around peer-to-peer file sharing can also be explained in terms of the 
change in the type of goods used in distribution, from large-scale capital 
goods to mid-grained shareable goods. Understood in these terms, solving 
this problem by squelching peer-to-peer sharing becomes implausible, both 
descriptively and prescriptively. Yet current policy analysis largely 
disregards how institutional changes will affect existing or emerging 
practices of sharing that may compete with, or substitute for, market-based 
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production. If indeed we live in an economic system made up of price- 
based, hierarchy-based, and sharing-based modalities of production, if it is 
true that optimizing our institutional system for price-based production 
undermines productivity in the sharing modality, and if it is true that our 
communications, computation, and information sectors are undergoing 
technological changes that improve the efficiency of social sharing, then we 
are making systematically mistaken policy choices not on the peripheries of 
our economies and societies, but at their very engines. 
I. CASE STUDIES: CARPOOLING AND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING 
The two motivating case studies that follow share four characteristics. 
First, they involve large-scale sharing practices among individuals who 
are either weakly related along other social dimensions or are complete 
strangers. Second, they involve sharing of private economic goods, owned 
by individuals for their own use. Third, in each case, there exist market 
models through which the excess capacity of these private goods could be, 
and sometimes is, cleared. Fourth, the output of the sharing practice in 
both cases is a rival good-it could be put to uses other than those that the 
participants in the sharing practice have put it to, and their using it for one 
purpose rivals the availability of the particular units shared to pursue 
other practices. In these characteristics carpooling and distributed 
computing are like peer-to-peer networks, or ad hoc wireless mesh 
networks, or like the labor individual programmers put into free software 
development. As I noted in the Introduction, carpooling provides a 
context to study social exchange as an alternative transactional framework 
motivated largely by straightforward instrumental reasons. Distributed 
computing, by contrast, is not readily explained by a simple instrumental 
perspective and offers an opportunity to explore effective large-scale 
projects that pay close attention to other forms of motivation. 
A. Carpools 
Carpooling is the second-largest commuter transportation system in the 
United States. It accounts for one-sixth to one-eighth of work-related trips 
(12% to 17% of trips, depending on the study)-twice as much as all other 
modes, except solo driving (75.4%), combined.7 In the United States, 
carpooling came to prominence during World War II, when oil and rubber 
7. John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 
NHTS, TRANSP. Q., Summer 2003, at 49, 53 tbl.3 (2003). 
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shortages made car sharing a policy goal.8 It reappeared as a national 
priority during the oil crisis of the mid- 1970s, but appears to have been on a 
declining trajectory since 19809-sliding from 19.7% of work-related trips 
to between 12% and 16.8% in 2000-2001.10 Despite its contraction, 
carpooling remains much more significant than public transit, which 
accounts for only 3.7% of work-related trips, in terms of total number of 
work-related trips nationally.11 Transit use drops even further for non-work- 
related trips, to 1% or 2%, while carpooling rises to account for over 50%.12 
Because non-work-related carpools often are composed only of family 
members, and because I am concerned primarily with nonintimate social 
sharing practices, I focus here on work-related carpools, where a majority 
of sharing appears to occur among non-household members.13 
The most important characteristic of carpooling from the perspective of 
this Essay is that money or explicit barter may be present or absent, and that 
money, where present, is usually limited to explicit cost sharing rather than 
used as a price. A central concern of this Essay is comparing instances 
where prices are the primary source of information about, and incentive for, 
resource allocation to instances where non-price-based social relations play 
those roles. Taking a coworker to work, rather than another person who is 
willing and able to pay more, is an instance of social production, not of 
price-based market production. This is true whether or not part of the social 
interaction includes sharing the cost of gas and parking-because the 
market-defined social cost is the unavailability of the seat to the higher 
bidder, not the operating cost of the vehicle. 
Carpool-like arrangements where seats are sold for a price are rare 
relative to non-price-based carpools. They include mostly jitneys,14 which 
8. Erik Ferguson, The Rise and Fall of the American Carpool: 1970-1990, 24 
TRANSPORTATION 349, 349-51 (1997). 
9. Id. at 349-54. 
10. According to the 2000 Census, the number is approximately 12%. See Pucher & Renne, 
supra note 7, at 50 tbl.1 (reporting data from U.S. Decennial Census, Supplemental Survey: 
Journey to Work). According to 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) data, the 
decline was more moderate, to 16.8%, for more clearly commute-related trips, defined as trips in 
urban areas for distances shorter than seventy-five miles. See id. at 53 tbl.3. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. How large a majority is not entirely clear. John Pucher and John Renne claim that 
"[flamily members are often passengers on car trips for shopping, recreation, church, and school, 
while they seldom accompany each other to work." Id. at 52-53. An older study reported that 
more than 40% of work-related carpools include members of the same household. Roger F. Teal, 
Carpooling: Who, How and Why, 21A TRANSP. RES. (PART A: GEN. RES.) 203, 206 tbl.2 (1987). 
14. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and 
the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 203-17 (2001) (discussing jitney operations in New 
York City and Miami and their potential to further help poor communities if allowed to operate 
legally); Isaac K. Takyi, An Evaluation ofJitney Systems in Developing Countries, 44 TRANSP. Q. 
163, 170 (1990) (listing typical characteristics ofjitney systems). 
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may follow predefined routes like buses or offer door-to-door services, and 
"car sharing" services, club-like arrangements in which members pay on a 
per-use basis in addition to the membership fee.15 But price-based car 
sharing is the exception, not the rule. The vast majority of carpooling 
occurs without pricing, though it often includes either explicit barter or cost 
sharing. Carpools often involve some exchange-X drives Mondays, Y 
drives Tuesdays,16 or Passenger A gets a ride from Driver B, Driver B gets 
to use the HOV lane.17 Money does not typically mediate this type of 
transaction.18 The rotation of driving and car-provisioning responsibilities is 
one major form of barter in this area,'9 but money does not appear to be 
used to balance divergent costs or values-the owner of the fuel-efficient 
subcompact does not compensate the owner of the comfy gas guzzler with 
more money or added driving days. Where money does change hands, it 
seems to be structured largely as participation in explicit costs, like gas, 
tolls, or parking fees.20 
In terms of organization and governance, practically all carpool 
arrangements are decentralized. Carpooling can be divided into two stages 
of activity: (1) formation and scheduling and (2) behavior of participants 
while carpooling. Other than scattered government- and employer-run 
voluntary ride-matching programs,21 carpool formation and scheduling 
15. See Franz E. Prettenthaler & Karl W. Steininger, From Ownership to Service Use 
Lifestyle: The Potential of Car Sharing, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 443, 445 (1999). The pricing 
model follows remarkably well Eitan Berglas's version of efficient pricing of club goods. See 
Eitan Berglas, On the Theory of Clubs, 66 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 116, 116-21 
(1976). 
16. See Aloise B. Heath, The Sociology of the Carpool, 12 NAT'L REV. 360, 360-61 (1962). 
17. See Marcela Kogan, Slugs and Body Snatchers, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, June 1997, at 39 
(1997). 
18. See Ferguson, supra note 8, at 352 ("Most carpools do not involve any financial 
transactions."). The academic literature on carpooling rarely mentions money. 
19. See, e.g., 1 F.W. DAVIS, JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INCREASED 
TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY THROUGH RIDESHARING: THE BROKERAGE APPROACH 57 (1977) 
(describing the "general norm of reciprocity" by which carpoolers alternate driving days and 
"repay their driving days" if illness or holiday disrupts the rotation schedule); Heath, supra note 
16, at 360-61. Davis's report presents a Department of Transportation survey of 4500 Knoxville, 
Tennessee-area carpoolers in 1974 and 1975. 
20. An informal survey of 250 rideshare postings on Craigslist in the San Francisco Bay Area 
revealed that in 30% of postings money is not mentioned, and in the vast majority of postings that 
do mention money, the request or offer modulates the money as being for costs like "gas" or 
"tolls." Only 10% of postings state a fixed price for a ride, while only 6% state a price without 
modulating the price by characterizing its purpose as cost sharing. The majority of users, whether 
or not money is asked for or offered, also specify social characteristics they desire in potential 
carpooling partners, such as being "good company" or having "good tunes." See Rideshare in San 
Francisco Bay Area, Craigslist (Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with author) (current listings available at 
http://www.craigslist.org/rid/). 
21. See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 174-90, 201-02 (1998). Oren provides an in-depth analysis of the Employee Trip 
Reduction mandate, the most ambitious federal effort to promote carpooling to date. It did not 
come close to producing the desired gains in alternatives to solo driving and in air pollution 
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appears to be highly decentralized. Carpools for work-related trips are 
usually composed of coworkers who live in rough proximity rather than of 
neighbors who work in rough proximity.22 More generally, household 
members, coworkers, and parents whose children have common 
transportation eeds typically contact potential carpooling partners and 
arrange a carpool without government or market involvement.23 In highly 
organized, regularized systems-for example, a carpool in which multiple 
parents drive children to and from after-school activities according to a 
written rotation schedule-trip scheduling is an integral part of carpool 
formation but is typically conducted by the participants.24 Sporadic, ad hoc 
carpools-for example, two roommates who decide to carpool to work on a 
given morning, or carpool pickup spots-do not require organized 
scheduling at all.25 
One of the most rarified forms of carpool formation and scheduling, 
observed in Northern Virginia and the San Francisco Bay Area, is ad hoc, 
or dynamic, carpooling. Ad hoc carpooling-in California called "casual 
carpooling"26 and in Virginia, "slugging"27-involves solo drivers picking 
up strangers at known meet points to form a carpool sufficiently large to 
take advantage of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes.28 The practice has 
been described as follows: 
[One driver] now has the system down cold. Between 7 and 
7:15 a.m., she drives to a slug line in the parking lot of a closed ... 
home-improvement store in her Northern Virginia suburb. [She] 
waits her turn behind other cars. When her car gets to the front of 
reduction. Oren concludes that the mandate fell short because it followed the structure of 
traditional technology-forcing environmental regulations, failing to account for the complexities 
inherent in changing individuals' commuting behaviors or for the breadth of factors affecting 
carpooling. See id. at 143-50; see also Roberto Wolfler Calvo et al., A Distributed Geographic 
Information System for the Daily Car Pooling Problem, 31 COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RES. 
2263 (2004), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com (search "Search for a Title" for 
"Computers and Operations Research"); D.J. Dailey et al., Seattle Smart Traveler: Dynamic 
Ridematching on the World Wide Web, 7 TRANSP. RES. (PART C: EMERGING TECH.) 17 (1999), 
available at http://www.its.washington.edu/pubs/transc.pdf The Microsoft Access-based system 
described by Calvo and his coauthors optimizes the composition of carpool groups and carpooling 
routes for employees of a large Italian employer and communicates with users via cell phone text 
messaging, e-mail, and the Internet. 
22. Teal, supra note 13, at 204. 
23. See 1 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56; Heath, supra note 16, at 360-61. 
24. See Heath, supra note 16, at 360-61. 25. See Kogan, supra note 17, at 39. 
26. A list of casual carpooling locations on a Bay Area website devoted to casual carpooling 
identifies both public transit sites and shopping mall-type locations. Casual Carpool Sites East 
Bay and San Francisco, http://ridenow.org/carpool/#locations (la t visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
27. The slugging community is a font of information about itself. See Slug-Lines.com, 
http://www.slug-lines.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
28. See Kogan, supra note 17, at 39. 
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the line, the next slug in line comes up to her window and asks 
[her] where she is going. The slug then shouts the destination to the 
others in line and gets in the car if he or she wants to go in that 
direction. The next couple of people in line headed in the same 
direction climb aboard, too.29 
The Northern Virginia terminology suggests a tension between this 
form of carpooling and public transit: The drivers are called "body 
snatchers," the riders, "slugs" (reportedly named after passengers who drop 
slugs instead of legitimate tokens into a bus's fare box).30 Indeed, a recent 
study of the practice in Northern Virginia documents substitution between 
dynamic carpooling and transit use,31 and suggests also that dynamic 
carpools depend on public transit as a fallback option for at least one leg in 
case the ad hoc carpool fails to form in both directions.32 Body snatchers 
can also find slugs, however, at non-transit pickup spots, which may be 
marked as dedicated carpool pickup stands, or unmarked-for example, 
street corners and parking lots-and may be designated by a centralized 
authority or by custom.33 While individual drivers and passengers may see 
each other on more than one occasion, body snatchers and slugs are 
typically strangers, and participants of the same functional type are 
fungible.34 
Dynamic carpooling appears to be a highly egalitarian activity: Body 
snatchers seem to take slugs regardless of gender, race, or occupation in 
order to fulfill their quotas and gain access to HOV lanes.35 One set of 
regularities, however, underscores an obstacle that dynamic carpooling 
must overcome, and offers a surprising hypothesis about impersonal 
social cooperation. In a deviation from gender-neutral pickup practices, 
solo women will not usually enter a car with two men already in it. 
"Unrelated" slugs on a line, however, will match up, whether male or 
female, irrespective of the gender of the driver.36 This underscores the fact 
that personal security fears may be a serious obstacle to carpooling with 
strangers.37 The matching practices suggest that security is improved by 
29. Id. at 42. 
30. Seeid. 
31. Frank Spielberg & Phillip Shapiro, Mating Habits of Slugs: Dynamic Carpool Formation 
in the 1-95/I-395 Corridor of Northern Virginia, in TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., TRANSPORTATION 
RESEARCH RECORD NO. 1711, at 31, 33 (2000). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.; see also Casual Carpool Sites East Bay and San Francisco, supra note 26. 
34. Spielberg & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 33. 
35. Id. The article reports results of a survey of more than 3000 drivers and passengers using 
an HOV lane to commute from Northern Virginia to Washington, D.C. Of 28,000 commuters 
using HOV lanes during their morning commute, the survey counted 3100 slugs. Id. at 34-35. 
36. Id. 
37. The California description of the issue is as follows: 
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combining more than one rider with each solo driver, where the riders 
themselves are not preorganized in groups. Each pair-driver plus each 
rider, and both riders vis-a-vis the driver-provides each individual with 
some security against an aggressive stranger. The importance of strength 
in numbers and lack of personal relationship is indicated by the fact that 
solo women will join two men in a car if the woman and man were both in 
line and no relationship between the two men is indicated.38 Carpoolers on 
this model seem to assume a prevalence and distribution of aggressive 
proclivities in the population that places a low probability on two 
randomly associated individuals cooperating aggressively. Given such a 
model of the prevalence and distribution of aggressive tendencies, 
fully impersonal cooperation can then be seen as safer than partially 
impersonal cooperation, where some subset of participants have a 
preexisting relationship. Another aspect of the same problem is "solved" 
by etiquette, as described in the "etiquette" page of the Northern Virginia- 
oriented website: 
The line does not leave a woman standing alone.... Either a 
man forfeits his place in line so that he is left standing, or the ride is 
declined until another slug arrives. Or, it is acceptable to ask the 
driver if he will take more slugs in order to clear the line. Whatever 
the situation, the intent is not to leave a woman standing alone on 
the street, especially at night.39 
As the reference to the etiquette indicates, though decentralized, ad hoc 
carpooling is not entirely unregulated; social norms seem to play an 
important role in the process. A list of such rules is found on the Northern 
Virginia site, and includes interesting insights. Slugs do not talk-at least, 
not unless the driver initiates.40 This appears to be the rule in the Bay Area 
as well.41 No money, gifts, or tokens of appreciation are offered or 
requested. No smoking or eating by driver or slug. No going out of line- 
either for slugs to push ahead, or drivers to "snatch" slugs before the line, 
As far as anyone seems to know, over the history of East Bay casual carpooling, 
there have been no untoward incidents. The "three-per-car" equirement has helped. A 
little caution and common sense also have helped. Passengers can always decline a 
ride. For example, female passengers have been known to decline rides in two-seat 
cars. They simply let another passenger go first, and wait for a larger vehicle. 
What Are Casual Car Pools?, http://ridenow.org/carpool/what.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
38. See Spielberg & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 35. 
39. Etiquette and Rules, http://www.slug-lines.com/Slugging/Etiquette.asp (lastvisited Sept. 
29, 2004) (emphasis omitted). 
40. Id. 
41. What Are Casual Car Pools?, supra note 37. 
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except that drivers can call out to a particular friend they see in line. The 
slug does not adjust the radio station or the heat.42 
Dynamic carpooling is an entirely impersonal, ad hoc practice with no 
perceptible socially stable set of participants. Yet participants do not use 
market mechanisms to clear seats. They rely instead on pure short-term 
mutual interest with no price (seats in exchange for eligibility for the HOV 
lane), combined with social norms and practices, to get body snatchers and 
slugs together.43 Behavioral controls may be somewhat more formal, but 
these are rules of etiquette that are largely under the control of the driver.44 
The decentralization of governance is paralleled in the normal case of 
carpools, where key behavioral decisions-driver rotation, seating 
42. Etiquette and Rules, supra note 39. 
43. Dynamic carpools cannot quite be presented as "proof"' that social provisioning is more 
efficient or desirable, because there is ambiguity as to the legal status of a similar arrangement 
that would instead operate on, for example, a spot-auction model. At least in some 
jurisdictions, such a practice could require licensing as a taxicab or otherwise as a vehicle for 
hire. But in the Northern Virginia corridor, the ambiguity is limited. The Alexandria, Virginia 
Code, for example, covers only taxicabs and vehicles for hire that are "maintained for ... hire." 
ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ? 9-12-1(7), (14) (2004), available at 
http://www.municode.com/resources/code_list.asp?statelD=46 (follow "Alexandria Code of 
Ordinances" link). While not impossible, it is highly unlikely that a vehicle used even a few 
days a week for one or two trips where money changes hands out of an entire weekly schedule 
would be defined as "maintained for hire." Slightly more ambiguously, the relevant ordinance 
in Arlington County, Virginia states that a "[t]axicab or other motor vehicle performing taxicab 
service means any motor vehicle having a seating capacity of not more than six (6) passengers 
and not operating on a regular route or between fixed terminals used in the transportation of 
passengers for hire or for compensation." ARLINGTON COUNTY, VA., CODE ? 25-2 (2003), 
available at http://www.municode.com/resources/code_list.asp?stateID=46 (follow "Arlington 
County Code of Ordinances" link) (emphasis omitted). This definition would seem to include 
carpooling for compensation, unless the sporadic use for carpooling would not designate the 
vehicle in general as a taxicab, but rather as falling under the category of an "other motor vehicle 
performing taxicab services." "Taxicab service," in turn, "means and includes the operation of any 
motor vehicle upon any street or highway, on call or on demand, accepting or soliciting 
passengers indiscriminately for transportation for hire between such points along streets or 
highways as may be directed by the passenger or passengers so being transported." Id. (emphasis 
omitted). The requirements of indiscriminate acceptance of solicitation, and the structure of the 
contract as one where the passenger directs the destination and route, would seem to exclude 
carpooling, even dynamic carpooling. The San Francisco ordinance, on the other hand, sweeps 
more broadly and probably would capture dynamic carpooling in its scope. S.F., CAL., POLICE 
CODE art. 16, div. I, ? 1076(a) (2000), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/government 
index.asp#codes ("A 'motor vehicle for hire' is hereby defined to mean and include every type, 
kind and class of privately owned motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicle for hire over which 
the City and County of San Francisco may exercise jurisdiction."). 
44. See Kogan, supra note 17, at 43. Kogan reports that 
etiquette rules inside the car are pretty much up to the driver. "Certain drivers will not 
talk," says one federal lawyer. "Others won't shut up. You are under their control; you 
are bumming a ride. Certain people will tell drivers to change the radio station, which I 
think is bold." 
Id. The Department of Transportation study of Knoxville-area commuters posits a general rule: 
The fewer and more intimate the participants in a carpool, the less formal the arrangements for 
carpool behavior. See 1 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 57. But it is not entirely clear what is 
meant by "formal," or what the source of the formal rules is. 
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arrangements, smoking prohibitions, waiting policy in case of tardiness- 
appear largely informal: Participants follow loose norms or ad hoc 
decisions rather than explicitly articulated rules.45 
While on its face carpooling seems to be primarily an instrumental 
exchange relationship, surveys show that carpoolers report a wide range of 
motivations for carpooling and that there is a wide variation between 
carpoolers and solo drivers in attitudes toward the costs and benefits of the 
practice. Carpoolers report reasons for carpooling both instrumental (to take 
advantage of HOV lanes,46 to reduce individual driving burdens,47 to reduce 
costs of automobile use and maintenance48) and noninstrumental (to have 
company,49 to be socially and environmentally responsible, to teach their 
children sociability50). A review of the existing research suggests that 
carpooling behavior does not vary by socioeconomic or demographic 
characteristics,51 but does correlate with beliefs that carpooling is good 
45. See 1 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56. When asked how they established rules for their 
carpools, study participants 
indicated that they had briefly discussed [the issues] on the phone or at work before 
forming the pool, or when they were initially riding together. There appears to be 
considerable reluctance to meet formally and discuss what will and will not be 
appropriate in a carpool.... When there are only two or three carpoolers, the riders 
frequently indicate there are not set rules among "friends." 
1 id. 
46. See, e.g., Joy Dahlgren, High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes. Not Always More Effective than 
General Purpose Lanes, 32 TRANSP. RES. (PART A: POL'Y & PRAC.) 99, 100 (1998); Spielberg & 
Shapiro, supra note 31, at 33; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes 
Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California 's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1238-40 
(2000); Kogan, supra note 17. 
47. See, e.g., Heath, supra note 16, at 361 ("A carpool, after all, has only one raison d'dtre: to 
drive as seldom as is necessary to get your own child to school and back every day."). 
48. See 1 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56 (reporting that surveyed carpoolers cited the 
price of gas and the price of parking as two of the top three reasons they carpooled); Ferguson, 
supra note 8, at 359 ("[F]alling real marginal fuel costs 'explain' a third of the observed decline in 
American carpooling between 1970 and 1990 ... ."). Consistent with the importance of cost 
savings, carpooling propensity appears to increase with commuting distance. See David T. 
Hartgen & Kevin C. Bullard, What Has Happened to Carpooling: Trends in North Carolina, 1980 
to 1990, in TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD NO. 1390, at 50, 58 
(1993); Teal, supra note 13, at 209. In areas where HOVs are excused from paying tolls during 
rush hour, see, e.g., Golden Gate Bridge: FasTrak & Tolls, http://www.goldengatebridge.org/ 
fastraktolls/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2004), carpooling offers additional cost savings. See also Teal, 
supra note 13, at 207-08 (finding that commuting cost burden correlates strongly with 
carpooling); Edward P. Weber et al., Understanding Urban Commuters: How Are Non-SOV 
Commuters Different from SOV Commuters?, TRANSP. Q., Spring 2000, at 105, 110-11. 
49. See 1 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 56. 
50. See Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, The Carpool: A Socializing Adjunct to the 
Educational Experience, 57 SOC. EDUC. 200, 208-09 (1984) (asserting that carpooling is one of 
the first regular contacts a child has with adults and children outside the immediate family and 
arguing that the carpool acts as an extremely important socializing arena for children). 
51. The 2001 NHTS suggests a minor income effect: Carpooling is slightly less prevalent 
among households with annual income less than $20,000 and has little if any correlation with 
income above $20,000. See Pucher & Renne, supra note 7, at 59 tbl.8. Income, education, and 
gender seem to have little effect on carpooling practices. See Ferguson, supra note 8, at 363-67. 
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because of all these desiderata52 and with a discount on concerns-freedom 
to choose your time and route, to be in peace, etc.-typical of solo drivers.53 
Whether these attitudinal differences are a reason for carpooling or a 
coherence-seeking realignment of the carpoolers' preferences to fit their 
practices is not obvious.54 What matters for our purposes, however, is that 
people report these desiderata to be important to them and to be reasons 
they give to themselves as to why they carpool. 
To conclude, carpooling is a deeply decentralized system, controlled by 
millions of individual decisions rather than by governments, market actors, 
or other institutional players. It is organized largely without the use of 
prices or bureaucratic instructions to clear seats and is usually interpreted 
and explicitly described by its participants as a social act, even when money 
does change hands to share explicit costs. 
B. Distributed Computing 
The phenomenon of "distributed computing" reflects an economically 
driven technical trend in computation, coupled with a social innovation. 
The first thing to understand is the idea of parallel computing. Imagine that 
I have a computational problem that can be solved by performing 100 
mathematical operations. I could solve it in one second using a computer 
that could perform 100 operations in one second, or I could solve it by 
dividing the operations to be performed into two batches of 50 operations 
and running them simultaneously on two computers, each capable of 
performing 50 operations per second. If the cost of improving the 
computation speed of a single processor increases superlinearly (that is, it 
costs more than twice as much to build a computer capable of 100 
operations per second than a computer capable of 50 operations per 
second), then I can achieve the same result at lower cost by lashing together 
two cheaper processors than I can achieve by building a faster processor. 
This does not mean that carpooling is entirely divorced from economic considerations. Many 
commuters report that trip-cost reduction is a significant consideration, see supra note 48, and trip 
and fuel cost and vehicle availability do show some correlation to commuting behavior, see 
Ferguson, supra note 8, at 371; Teal, supra note 13, at 207. 
52. See Abraham D. Horowitz & Jagdish N. Sheth, Ride Sharing to Work: An Attitudinal 
Analysis, in TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD NO. 637, at 1 (1977) 
(concluding that only attitudinal factors-in contrast o socioeconomic and demographic factors- 
are significant in explaining the carpooling behavior of 822 surveyed commuters); Norbert 
Oppenheim, Carpooling: Problems and Potentials, 33 TRAFFIC Q. 253, 259 (1979). 
53. See Horowitz & Sheth, supra note 52, at 5 fig.5; Weber et al., supra note 48, at 110-11; 
see also Paul A.M. Van Lange et al., A Social Dilemma Analysis of Commuting Preferences: The 
Roles of Social Value Orientation and Trust, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 796 (1998). 
54. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511(2004). 
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Parallel computing, of course, is not costless. One must break up the 
problem into well-designed pieces that can run simultaneously, rather than 
having one processor wait for the other to finish, and there is overhead in 
managing the information input and output flows to and from the 
processors, both to each other and to the system memory. The tradeoff 
therefore becomes slightly more complex, but is fundamentally unchanged. 
Parallel computing will achieve similar results to a single processor at 
lower cost if the total amount of overhead lost to parallelization is less than 
the cost differential for building the added computation capacity into one 
computer. This simplified explanation describes more or less why, by the 
end of the twentieth century, most supercomputers were made of thousands 
of simple processors lashed together and why parallelization became an 
important field of computer science. 
Parallelization in supercomputing set the stage for the next step: 
Internet-based distributed computing. As Michael Shirts and Vijay Pande 
noted in 2000, the number of processors that Internet-based distributed 
computing could in principle harness dwarfs the largest supercomputers.55 
Supercomputers can lash together thousands of processors at a cost of tens 
of millions of dollars. But connected to the Internet there are millions of 
computers, and one can lash together hundreds of thousands of processors, 
rather than thousands, using their spare cycles, if one can overcome the 
quite substantial design difficulties involved in structuring problems so that 
they can efficiently be solved by very large numbers of processors with 
highly variable availability and orders of magnitude slower 
communications than those possible among processors located in arrays 
designed for, and dedicated to working together in, a single physical 
machine.56 Once the problem is defined, however, it can be approached by 
designing new algorithms that trade off processing for communication and 
focusing on algorithms that restructure the description of solutions to 
problems so as to assume much looser constraints on the number of 
processors and much tighter constraints on communications than those used 
55. Michael Shirts & Vijay S. Pande, Screen Savers of the World Unite!, 290 SCIENCE 1903, 
1903 (2000). 
56. The overarching ambition of connecting all the computation and storage resources 
connected to the network in a capacity grid is also known as "grid computing." See, e.g., Ian 
Foster et al., The Anatomy of the Grid. Enabling Scalable Virtual Organizations, 15 INT'L J. 
HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING APPLICATIONS 3 (2001); Leon Erlanger, Distributed 
Computing: An Introduction, EXTREMETECH, Apr. 4, 2002, http://www.extremetech.com/ 
article2/0,1558,11769,00.asp; Brian Hayes, Collective Wisdom, AM. SCIENTIST, Mar.-Apr. 1998, 
at 118, 118, available at http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/20836; 
Ian Foster, What is the Grid? A Three Point Checklist (July 20, 2002), http://www- 
fp.mcs.anl.gov/~foster/Articles/WhatlsTheGrid.pdf. 
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in mainstream supercomputers.57 While designing an algorithm to achieve 
such scaling is difficult, it is not impossible, and the organizer of a project 
obviously has the incentive to develop such algorithms in order to benefit 
from the potential to mobilize distributed computing to solve his or her 
problems.58 
SETI@home is the paradigmatic Internet-based distributed computing 
project. It harnesses idle processor cycles of about 4,500,000 users around 
the world. The users download a small screen saver. When the users are not 
using their computers, the screen saver starts up, downloads problems for 
calculation-in the case of SETI@home, radio astronomy signals to be 
analyzed for regularities as part of the search for extraterrestrial 
intelligence-and calculates the problems it has downloaded. Once the 
program calculates a solution it automatically sends its results to the main 
site. The cycle continues for as long as, and every time that, the screen 
saver is activated, indicating that the computer is idle from its user's 
perspective. Using this approach, SETI@home became the fastest 
"supercomputer" in the world, capable of performing, as of the summer of 
2003, calculations at a speed sixty percent faster than the NEC Earth 
Simulator, formally the fastest supercomputer in the world, four times as 
fast as the next fastest supercomputer, and seven times faster than the 
following three fastest supercomputers,59 including the fastest 
57. See, e.g., Michael R. Shirts & Vijay S. Pande, Mathematical Analysis of Coupled Parallel 
Simulations, 86 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 4983 (2001) (explaining how to use a statistical 
algorithm to scale the speed of protein folding deducible from a computer simulation linearly with 
the number of processors added); Stefan M. Larson et al., Folding@Home and Genome@Home: 
Using Distributed Computing To Tackle Previously Intractable Problems in Computational 
Biology, http://folding.stanford.edu/papers/HorizonReview.pdf (lastvisited Sept. 29, 2004); see 
also D. Laforenza, Grid Programming: Some Indications Where We Are Heading, 28 PARALLEL 
COMPUTING 1733 (2002) (reviewing contemporary understanding of the design challenges posed 
by such heterogenous and distributed computing systems). 
58. The primary oddity from a rational choice perspective is that scientists would not develop 
the algorithm unless they thought that users would contribute their processing cycles should the 
algorithm be developed. In theory, given that there is no easy story to tell about why contributors 
would volunteer their excess capacity, scientists should not develop these algorithms. Note, 
however, that there is nothing irrational about the scientists' beliefs that led them to design these 
systems. It is perfectly coherent for an agent to have a belief that others are like the agent and to 
hold the belief that conditional upon the agent's behaving in a trusting reciprocal way, others will 
behave similarly. Given that the scientists who develop these algorithms have no need to believe 
that any particular individual agent will cooperate, but only that there is some set of others who 
would behave as the scientist would and cooperate, building the project is not only permissible for 
a rational agent but represents a high likelihood of finding cooperators. 
59. SETI@home statistics showed a speed of over 54 teraflops per second. The more 
traditional supercomputers, which consist of computation clusters from processors under the 
ownership or control of a single firm or organization, achieved 35.9 teraflops (NEC Earth 
Simulator), 13.9 teraflops (HP ASCI-Q at Los Alamos National Laboratories), 7.6 teraflops 
(Linux Network), and 7.3 teraflops (IBM ASCI at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories). See Top 
500 Supercomputer Sites, Top 500 List for June 2003, http://www.top500.org/list/2003/06 (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2004). These numbers and relationships offer, of necessity, a snapshot. As this 
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supercomputer that IBM had built at that point.60 The simple fact of the 
existence and success of SETI@home and similar projects, coupled with 
the fact that only a tiny fraction of the world's processors participate in 
similar projects,61 suggests that there is, and will continue to be in the 
foreseeable future, a significant amount of idle computation resources 
extant in the world.62 
Another of the largest and best known distributed computing projects is 
Folding@home, a site run out of Stanford University and dedicated to 
simulating protein folding. As of late November 2003, a snapshot of its 
usage statistics reveals that it had amassed contributions of over 572,000 
processors, of which about twenty percent were active at a given moment, 
contributed by 272,000 users, some of whom were self-organized into over 
28,000 teams.63 The contributions were concentrated largely in the United 
States and Western Europe.64 
SETI@home and Folding@home provide a good basis for describing 
the fairly common characteristics of such projects. First, these are 
noncommercial projects, engaged in pursuits understood widely as 
scientific, for the general good, seeking to harness contributions of 
individuals who wish to contribute to such larger-than-themselves goals. 
Like SETI@home, projects like Folding@home, Fightaids@home (a 
Scripps Institute project that uses computational biology to screen candidate 
drugs for treating HIV based on their shape and chemical characteristics; 
candidates so identified can then be further tested in laboratories), and 
Essay was going to press, IBM announced that it had just surpassed the NEC Earth Simulator by a 
nose, delivering a 36-teraflops-per-second computer. John Markoff, I.B.M. Supercomputer Sets 
World Record for Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at C4. At that point, SETI@home was 
averaging between 64 and 69 teraflops per second. See SETI@home, Current Total Statistics, 
http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/totals.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
60. See supra note 59. Compare the results at Top 500 Supercomputer Sites, supra note 59, 
with the 54 teraflops per second calculated by SETI@home when this Essay was drafted in late 
2003. 
61. There is no hard technological block to, for example, using microwave ovens for 
computation on this model. It is more a question of connectivity and engineering. But as we move 
to a more highly interconnected environment of pervasive computing, the number of connected 
computers per person in the industrialized world will be very large. Many of these almost never 
require their computation capacity. The embedded computer of a microwave oven, for example, 
has spare capacity whenever the oven is not being used. Assuming an average twenty minutes a 
day of actual cooking, that is likely around ninety-eight percent of the time. 
62. The developers of SETI@home are now also providing the development and deployment 
of a platform for a potentially next-generation improvement-a cross-project common platform 
called BOINC, the Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing, that will allow many 
projects and many users to be matched dynamically as needs and capacities change rather than 
having every user dedicate his or her computer to helping one project or another and downloading 
project-specific software for each project. 
63. For daily statistics, see Folding@home, Folding@home Stats, http://folding.stanford.edu/ 
stats.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
64. See Folding@home, Folding@home Maps, http://www.stanford.edu/group/pandegroup/ 
folding/maps.html ( ast visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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Genome@home (a Stanford-based project dedicated to modeling new 
artificial genes that can create artificial proteins) appeal to broad other- 
regarding concerns. Other sites, like those dedicated to cryptography or 
math, have a narrower appeal, but are also "altruistic," or perhaps hobbyist, 
in their basic motivational appeal. The absence of money is, in any event, 
typical of the large majority of active distributed computing projects.65 
Fewer than one-fifth of these projects mention money at all. Most of those 
that do mention money refer to a share of a generally available prize for 
solving a scientific or mathematical challenge and mix an appeal to hobby 
and altruism with the promise of money. Only two of almost sixty projects 
active in November 2003 were built on a pay-per-contribution basis.66 
In the SETI@home internal survey,67 the project found that users 
respond to the question, "What is your main reason for running 
SETI@home?" with a strong emphasis on "good of humanity" (58%) or 
"keep my computer productive" (17%). A little more than 5% of answers 
suggested a search for fame or explicit recognition, like getting one's name 
on the site's top-hundred list. While far from scientific, the SETI survey 
offers some texture as to the motivational self-descriptions of participants, 
albeit within a choreographed questionnaire, and certainly reflects the 
assumptions of those running the site about the kind of motivations for 
which they design their sites. Similarly, the stated design assumptions of 
the organizers of Folding@home and Genome@home reflect a belief that 
users contribute their cycles because they are motivated by lay interest in 
the projects, a desire not to waste computing resources, or an amateur 
interest in either computers or the science involved.68 
65. The aggregate descriptions are based on observations made in November 2003 of fifty- 
seven projects linked to a site dedicated to collecting links to all distributed processing projects. 
See Intemet-Based Distributed Computing Projects, http://www.aspenleaf.com/distributed/distrib- 
projects.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
66. These sites, G6mez Performance Networks, whose front end is http://www.gomez.com/ 
and whose peer-network back end is https://www.peer.gomez.com/index.aspx, and Capacity 
Calibration Network, http://agent.capcal.com/agentfaq.asp, differ functionally from distributed 
computing projects. The service they offer is running network traffic analysis by placing queries 
from topologically diverse locations. They require their users' topological diversity, not their 
processing power. Therefore, not all PCs are equal in their eyes. The specificity of the 
requirements, which generates the need to reject many putative contributors, likely contributes to 
the difficulty of attracting volunteers, in addition to the divergent social meanings of calls to "help 
organizations olve their business problems" as compared to "help fight AIDS." Money then steps 
in as a reasonably well-understood motivational source for a project ill suited to mobilize 
contributors ocially. Because neither project is trying to aggregate as many users as possible, or 
crunch as many numbers as possible, overall "success" of these projects is not qualitatively 
comparable to SETI@home or similar projects. 
67. SETI@home, SETI@home Poll Results, http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/polls.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
68. Larson et al., supra note 57, at 6. They do not explain how lay interest is different than 
amateur interest, but one suspects that these stand in for different levels of engagement and 
hobbyist enthusiasm. 
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The assumptions about the motivations of contributors are translated 
into both the client interface design and the websites supporting the project. 
Interfaces are explicitly designed to provide participants with feedback 
about their own contributions, information about the scientific context and 
output of their contributions, and a platform for both competitive and 
mutually supportive social interaction. The SETI client shows users how 
their own processing component is going, as well as offering a graphic 
representation of the data processed, which is aesthetically pleasing but 
relatively opaque as an explanation of the science or the results. 
Folding@home offers a visualization of the actual calculation performed on 
the computer as a screen saver, providing an intuitive, if still analytically 
opaque, visualization of the work done. 
Climateprediction.net, a project focused on simulating climate change, 
takes a different approach. Each user downloads a complete simulation, so 
that the world simulated on his or her computer is a complete single model 
of what happens if CO2 levels double from pre-industrial levels while a 
variety of other parameters are tweaked. The screen saver allows 
participants to see how the world they are simulating changes. The site 
offers people the ability to compare "their" world to those of others and to a 
baseline simulation, providing greater opportunity for individual 
participation in reading the results. 
Most of the distributed computing projects provide, on the server side, a 
series of utilities and statistics intended to allow contributors to attach 
meaning to their contributions in a variety of ways. The projects appear to 
be eclectic in their implicit social and psychological theories of the 
motivations for sharing. Sites describe the scientific purpose of the models 
and the specific scientific output, including posting articles that have used 
the calculations.69 In these components, the project organizers seem to 
assume some degree of taste for generalized altruism and the pursuit of 
69. See, e.g., Laurence Loewe, Evolution@home: Experiences with Work Units That 
Span More than 7 Orders of Magnitude in Computational Complexity (May 21- 
24, 2002), http://www.evolutionary-research. org/Science/Papers/2002/Loewe2002-EaHworkunits.pdf; 
Climateprediction.net, Climate Science Explained, http://www.climateprediction.net/science/ 
index.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Climateprediction.net, Publications Related to 
Climateprediction.net, http://www.climateprediction.net/science/publications.php (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004); Eon, A Brief Scientific Overview, http://eon.chem.washington.edu/brief.php (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004); Eon, Related Articles, http://eon.chem.washington.edu/papers.php (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004); Evolution@home, Scientific Background of the Simulator-Models, 
http://www.evolutionary-research.org/Science/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); 
Folding@home, Recent Research Papers, http://www.stanford.edu/group/pandegroup/folding/ 
papers.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Folding@home, Scientific Background, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/pandegroup/folding/science.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); 
Genome@home, http://www.stanford.edu/group/pandegroup/genome/ ( ultiple links under 
"Scientific Background") (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); SETI@home, Current Progress Summary, 
http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/processpage/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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meaning in contributing to a common goal. They also implement a variety 
of mechanisms to reinforce the sense of purpose, so there are aggregate 
statistics about total computations performed.7" But the sites also seem to 
assume a healthy dose of agonistic giving, as well. For example, most of the 
sites allow individuals to track their own contributions, to see their effect 
accumulating, but some also provide "user of the month" type rankings, 
noting who contributed the most cycles and similar statistics.71 
An interesting characteristic of quite a few of these projects is the 
ability to create "teams" of users, who in turn compete to see who has 
provided more cycles or work units. SETI@home in particular taps into 
ready-made nationalisms by offering country-level statistics.72 Some of the 
team names on Folding@home also suggest other out-of-project bonding 
measures, such as national or ethnic bonds (Overclockers Australia or 
Alliance Francophone), technical minority status (Linux or 
MacAddict4Life), organizational affiliation (the University of Tennessee or 
the University of Alabama), and shared cultural reference points (The 
Knights Who Say Ni!).73 In addition, the sites offer platforms for simple 
connectedness and mutual companionship by offering user forums to 
discuss the science and the social participation involved.74 
It is possible that these sites are shooting in the dark as far as 
motivating sharing is concerned, but it is also possible that they have tapped 
into a valuable insight, which is that people behave for all sorts of different 
reasons, including all sorts of different reasons to act generously, and that at 
least in this domain adding reasons to participate-some agonistic, some 
altruistic, some reciprocity seeking-does not have a crowding-out effect. 
70. See, e.g., Climateprediction.net, Climateprediction.net Overall Stats, http://cpdn.comlab. 
ox.ac.uk/user/totstats.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Evolution@home, High Scores of the 
Evolutionary-Research Supercomputing Adventure, http://www.evolutionary-research.org/ 
Scores/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Folding@home, supra note 63; SETI@home, 
supra note 59. 
71. See, e.g., Eon, Current Eon Statistics, http://eon.chem.washington.edu/groups/ 
stats_main.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Evolution@home, supra note 70; Folding@home, 
Donor Statistics, http://vspx27.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/main.py?qtype=userstats (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004); SETI@home, Top Users, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/stats/users.html (last visited Sept. 
29, 2004). 
72. SETI@home, Countries, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/stats/countries.html (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). 
73. Folding@home, Team Statistics, http://vspx27.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/main.py?qtype= 
teamstats (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
74. See, e.g., Climateprediction.net, Interactive User Area, http://www.climateprediction.net/ 
user/index.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Folding@home, Folding-community.org, 
http:!/forum.folding-community.org/homepage.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); SETI@home, 
Other Message Boards and Chat Rooms, http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edulother_bbs.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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Further research on the presence and pattern of crowding out between 
different sharing patterns would be useful in the design of such projects.75 
II. LUMPINESS, GRANULARITY, AND SHAREABLE GOODS 
These case studies are intended to motivate the analysis. They show us 
that there are large-scale sharing phenomena in the world that successfully 
provision material desiderata through social sharing practices. These 
practices involve the sharing of private goods-automobiles and personal 
computers-as inputs. They involve rival outputs-seats in cars going from 
point a to point b, or computer processor cycles devoted to problem a rather 
than to problem b. They exist alongside market mechanisms for delivering 
substitutable functionality. And they work well; in some cases, better than 
market mechanisms. This Part and the next will seek to answer, within the 
framework of economics, why this happens, why it is sustainable, and when 
it is efficient. This Part is dedicated to describing a class of characteristics 
that, in combination, define a situation where it is likely that individuals 
will overinvest in capacity-generating goods, like PCs and automobiles, that 
will then have excess capacity, widely distributed in small quanta among 
large numbers of individuals in a society. The next Part will explain why 
this excess capacity may better be distributed by social sharing than by 
secondary markets (or administrative allocation). While the goods I call 
here "shareable goods" could be understood as a subclass of "club goods"76 
or "common pool resources,"77 the additional specification more precisely 
75. On crowding out between money and nonmonetary rewards, see infra Section III.B. 
76. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); Berglas, supra note 
15, at 116-21; James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1-14 
(1965). A description of the current state of the theory is available in RICHARD CORNES & TODD 
SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996). 
77. An early and broad claim in the name of cormnons in resources for communication and 
transportation, as well as human community building-like roads, canals, or social gathering 
places-is Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). Rose's observations on commons in waterways and 
highways had far more radical implications in the long term than the direction that the bulk of the 
literature took over the course of the 1990s, because she focused on cases where commons 
superseded areas that had previously been private property--like turnpikes or private property 
over which public paths were later recognized. As such, it suggested that there were areas where 
commons were strictly superior to private property; that these commons existed at the very heart 
of our commercial system; and that many of the most important of these commons, like the 
highways and waterways, were not limited common property regimes but were in fact open for 
anyone to use under very general usage rules. Condensing around the work of Elinor Ostrom, a 
different, narrower and less threatening literature developed over the course of the 1990s. It was 
concerned with showing that there were places where nonproperty regimes, or more accurately, 
common property regimes, were sustainable and stable over long periods of time. This line of 
literature was less threatening than Rose's original claims because it inverted all three radical 
implications of her claims. Common property regimes were shown to be stable, not claimed to be 
more efficient. They were studied on the peripheries of the main economies, and could be 
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isolates individually owned goods that have excess capacity and are 
available for sharing. 
The basic intuition is simple. There are goods that are "lumpy," by 
which I mean that given a state of technology, they can only be provisioned 
in certain discrete bundles that offer discontinuous amounts of functionality 
or capacity. In order to have any computation, for example, a consumer 
must buy a computer processor, which in turn only comes in certain speeds 
or capacities. Lumpy goods can, in turn, be fine, mid-, or large grained. A 
large-grained good is one that is so expensive that it can only be used by 
aggregating demand for it. Industrial capital equipment, like steam engines, 
is of this type. Fine-grained goods are of a granularity that allows 
consumers to buy precisely as much of the goods as has the amount of 
capacity they require, such as a donut or a cup of coffee. Mid-grained goods 
are small enough for an individual to justify buying for her own use, given 
their price and her willingness and ability to pay for the functionality she 
plans to use. If enough individuals in society buy and use such mid-grained 
lumpy goods, that society will have a large amount of excess capacity "out 
there," in the hands of individuals. The problem of how to harness that 
excess capacity and use it to provision the requirements of others is the 
problem that Part III deals with. If you are comfortable with this simple 
intuitive explanation of what mid-grained lumpy goods are and why they 
would generate excess capacity, you may wish to skip most of the 
remainder of this Part and go directly to its conclusion in Section D. What 
follows here is a more or less careful working out of lumpiness and 
granularity, and the conditions under which we should expect there to be 
substantial excess capacity in the hands of individual owners of goods that 
makes large-scale sharing practices feasible. 
understood as stable holdovers, rather than as strictly more efficient alternatives that superseded 
preexisting private property regimes. And they were, in fact, a property regime, except that the 
outer boundary of the property included many participants, among whom proprietary interests 
were divided through governance mechanisms rather than through property and contract. The 
condensation point of this literature was ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1992); another seminal study was 
JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). A brief intellectual history of the 
study of common resource pools and common property regimes can be found in Charlotte Hess & 
Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool Resource (Nov. 
9-11, 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/ostromhes.pdf. 
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A few assumptions and terms run throughout this Part.78 Resources or 
goods have a usable lifetime-which can be of any length-once put in 
service. Owning a resource is not intrinsically utility generating. Use of the 
resource over its lifetime is what generates value to the agent. The welfare- 
producing use that a resource enables is its "functionality." Agents value a 
resource or good at the utility that use of its functionality is expected to 
generate over the lifetime of the resource. The degree to which the 
functionality of a resource can be used is its "capacity." A good has a 
lifetime capacity, which is the total amount of functionality it can deliver 
over its usable life. This may or may not be separate from, and greater than, 
the good's usable capacity, which is the capacity it can deliver within the 
time frame necessary for use of the functionality to generate the welfare 
sought by users. Capacity is technologically given. People purchase, make, 
or otherwise invest in putting into operation units of goods or resources that 
are not themselves the utility sought, but rather are resource packages that 
have the capacity to produce functionalities. I begin with two special cases 
that are easily grasped and then generalize. 
A. Renewable Resources 
Renewable resources are resources that can deliver their functionality 
within a given time frame and are then capable of delivering that 
functionality again at a later time. A perfectly renewable good is capable of 
delivering exactly the same amount of functionality over time, irrespective 
of whether its functionality was used in full at a prior moment in time. Its 
expected lifetime is unaffected by use. An imperfectly renewable good 
either delivers some, but not all, of the amount of its functionality with each 
successive use, or loses expected lifetime with each use. A nonrenewable 
good is one that can deliver its functionality only once. 
"Spectrum" is a perfectly renewable good. Dining tables, computer 
processors, and automobiles are slightly less perfectly renewable, but still 
almost perfectly renewable. Rubber bands, soccer balls, and lithium ion 
batteries are imperfectly renewable. Apples and matches are strictly 
nonrenewable. Renewability is equivalent to nonrivalry along the time 
dimension. A perfectly renewable good is like a nonrival good as among all 
78. Part of the reason for the fairly elementary definitions of these terms is that the piece is 
intended to be readable across disciplines. For economists, "functionality" and "capacity" should 
be treated as interchangeable words. Shareable goods can be thought of as capital goods with a 
certain capacity. "Granularity" describes a certain coarseness of partitioning of these goods. "Mid- 
grained" shareable goods describe a technologically determined package size that results in a 
market in which the goods are sold as consumption goods bundled with capital goods of some 
capacity. 
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and only those uses that can be timed to occur asynchronically without loss 
of value. Perfectly renewable goods are, in this sense, impure public goods, 
where the limitation on their use by marginal users is their requirement that 
time pass before they can deliver additional units of desired functionality.79 
An individual will decide whether to put a unit of a good into service 
by comparing the value of its functionality over time, discounted, to its 
price. Imagine a good that expires after a year in service, irrespective of 
how it is used. The individual plans to use the functionality once a week, 
for an hour, a use that the individual values at v and which the individual 
cannot replicate except by owning a unit of the good. The individual will be 
willing to pay up to 52v for a unit of the good (ignoring discount). Where, 
as in this case, an individual's demand for functionality is variable over 
time and the functionality can be delivered by a renewable good, the 
individual has an overcapacity to deliver the functionality. This 
overcapacity is precisely the extent of the divergence between the time 
necessary for renewal of the good's capacity to provide the functionality 
and the time lapse between instances where the individual demands the 
capacity. In the example, assuming the good is perfectly and immediately 
renewable, the individual owns an overcapacity of 8684v, reflecting the 
availability of the unit to be used by someone other than the owner for 24 
hours a day for six days, 23 hours the seventh day, for 52 weeks, which is 
the life of the unit (assuming for simplicity that others value the use as 
much as the individual). 
Intuitively, take a renewable resource like a lithium ion battery. 
Sometimes, the owner of a camcorder or camera will need more power than 
a full battery can offer, and will need it again as soon as it has recharged. In 
that setting, the good provides less functionality than desired by its owner, 
because the time for its renewal is greater than the time demanded for 
additional capacity. The degree to which this will be common, the lost 
utility from not having power, and the price of a second battery relative to 
the owner's budget will determine whether the owner will put a second, 
backup unit in service. Sometimes, the owner will be able to let the battery 
lie in the device for weeks, not needing power at all because of a lack of 
opportunities to shoot videos or photos. During that period, the battery has 
excess capacity: If held by another, it could have delivered its power, and 
been renewed, before its owner required it again--multiple times. With 
batteries, our experience may resist this example because we know that they 
79. Another way of thinking about them is that they are club goods with a zero maintenance 
cost, as to which congestion is measured as the likely divergence, for a reference agent, between 
the desired time for delivery of the functionality and the actual time at which functionality is 
available given the sequencing or queuing algorithm used to synchronize use of the resource. 
300 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
are not infinitely rechargeable. With computer processing cycles, that is less 
the case. 
B. Rapidly Decaying Resources 
A resource is rapidly decaying when the rate at which it decays is 
greater than the rate at which one user can consume its capacity. Once a 
user decides that the capacity he can in fact extract before the good decays 
is high enough to justify putting a unit into operation, the functionality is 
overprovisioned as to that individual, and excess capacity is created for the 
short lifetime of the resource. Unless that capacity is used by others-who 
may borrow or buy it-it will be wasted.80 
A single trip in a car (unlike the car itself, which is highly, but not 
perfectly, renewable) is a rapidly decaying good. Once the owner of a car 
decides to travel from home to work, the good "four seats going from A to 
B on Tuesday morning" has been created and will last only for the length 
of the trip. Carpooling is in this instance a practice of sharing a rapidly 
decaying good. (In this, carpooling is different from lending a car to a 
friend for the weekend or for a trip to the grocery shop, which uses the 
car's renewability, not the rapidly decaying character of a trip the owner 
is about to undertake.) This category likely covers the observations of 
some behavioral ecologists, who claim that sharing is particularly 
common in large-package foods-for example, the observation that in the 
same community, hunters will share widely the meat from a large sea 
turtle, but will net no more of finer-grained foods, like small lagoon fish, 
than they need within the household, and then will not share the fish in the 
broader community that would normally share in the turtles.81 
80. Interestingly, Locke bases his praise for money precisely in terms of its capacity to store 
the value of a rapidly decaying good in the sense described, thereby giving the provisioning agent 
the value of his labor, while avoiding the predicament hat a laborer takes from the common and 
then wastes what he took. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES 
OF GOVERNMENT 265, 292-96, 299-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
81. See Rebecca L. Bliege Bird & Douglas W. Bird, Delayed Reciprocity and Tolerated 
Theft: The Behavioral Ecology ofFood-Sharing Strategies, 38 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 49, 49- 
78 (1997). While the fact may explain the origins of the sharing practices, it does not explain their 
continued persistence, given that "most households either owned or had access to at least one 
freezer." Id. at 62. It is important o note also that the bulk of anthropological study of sharing 
practices is not limited to goods with these characteristics, and may relate to abundant goods, as in 
the case of potlatch societies, as well as to scarce and unique goods that do not rapidly decay and 
are not "shareable" in the sense I describe here, like the objects of kula rings. For one of the most 
important recent contributions to this literature, as well as an intellectual map of its origins, see 
GODELIER, supra note 6. 
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C. Lumpiness in General 
The two special cases of renewable resources and rapidly decaying 
resources can be generalized to describe "lumpy" resources of mid-grained 
granularity. A lumpy resource is one that delivers utility in discrete 
packages, rather than continuously. Physically, any resource is "lumpy," 
including rice or even water (at the molecular level). So "lumpiness" is 
intended as a concept in economics, not physics. It describes a relationship 
between technically attainable package size and extant demand by agents. It 
refers to a divergence between the package size (of each unit or of any cost- 
effective aggregation of units) and the extant demand of individual agents 
for the functionality produced by the good. One might therefore think of the 
"lumpiness" of a resource as reflecting the capacity of a single unit of a 
resource to provide its functionality and the probability that that amount of 
utility or functionality supplied by any physically obtainable number of 
discrete units of the resource in a time frame will diverge from the amount 
of functionality demanded by an agent in that time frame. 
An agent will invest in owning a unit82 of a lumpy resource if the utility 
the agent achieves over the lifetime of the resource is greater than the price 
of the unit for its lifetime. The fact that a resource can produce more utility 
over its lifetime than the agent needs over that lifetime is irrelevant to his 
decision whether to invest in a unit or not. That decision is made purely by 
comparing the value over lifetime, expressed as the capacity to produce a 
functionality flow, with the cost of a unit (bracketing, for now, the 
possibility of a secondary market or sharing system). 
In order to give lumpiness some persistence, both supply and demand 
of the functionality must be in discrete units. If we were to define the 
agent's demand as capable of fulfillment incrementally, for example, so that 
by provisioning a unit of a resource that offers ninety percent of what the 
agent requires she could fulfill ninety percent of her demand, the analysis 
would collapse back into smooth demand and supply curves. The 
assumption must be, then, that, like functionality supply, demand comes in 
discrete units. Fulfillment of ninety percent of the requirement is no 
fulfillment at all. Intuitively, an automobile without a gas tank or missing a 
wheel cannot get one to work, even if the rest of the car is there. Agents, 
82. For simplicity of exposition, I will treat a collection of small but discrete units that cannot 
be aggregated into precisely the amount of functionality desired as a single lumpy unit that 
delivers functionality in an excess amount equal to the divergence caused by the last incremental 
unit. This does not change the analysis, but simply obviates the need to talk about units that are 
small grained but still lumpy in the sense that no combination of obtainable units will deliver 
precisely the amount of functionality desired. 
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then, will not provision units capable of providing less than some threshold 
of demanded functionality. 
The discrete unit of demand, however, remains the single agent. It is 
possible for agents to aggregate their demand in order to co-provision a 
very large-grained lumpy good, that is, one whose functionality is multiple 
times greater than the requirements of any agent, so that it can serve the 
demand of multiple agents. The obvious example of this is where the labor 
market provisions the power of a steam engine or other large machine to a 
number of workers on an assembly line, or where farmers' cooperatives 
provision harvesters. But I am concerned here with finer-grained goods that 
do not require aggregating the demand of multiple agents to provision a 
single unit. 
Because demand is discrete, units that underproduce functionality 
below some required threshold (automobiles without wheels or gas tanks) 
will not be provisioned. Units that will be put into operation are therefore a 
subset of those that are lumpy in the general sense defined earlier. That 
subset consists of those units whose capacity equals or exceeds the 
threshold functionality demanded by the agent who put them into service, in 
that time frame. The total social capacity for provisioning the functionality 
in a given time frame will be the sum of capacity capable of being 
provisioned by all units of the resource put into operation in that time frame 
by the agents who have provisioned units. The excess capacity of the units 
in operation at a given time relative to the requirements of their owners is 
the "slack" of this resource set. Note that "slack" here refers not to the 
claim that there will necessarily be overcapacity at an aggregate social 
level, but rather that there will be some capacity that would be unused if 
only the owners of units used the capacity generated by the units they 
owned. Recall that we assume for now no transfers of excess capacity. The 
amount of excess capacity will be the sum of all capacity of units in 
operation at a given time, less the amount required by all owners of units in 
that time frame discounted for each owner by the probability that the unit 
she placed in operation will produce either exactly as much capacity as she 
will require or less (in which case the owner of the unit would capture all 
the capacity produced by the unit she owns). 
If units have a technically predefined capacity and agents have variable 
demand for the functionality, then the larger the number of agents who put 
units into operation, the higher the probability that some of the agents will 
own resources that have slack as to their needs and the higher the 
probability that the universe of agents who own units will have excess 
capacity among them. The probability that each agent requires exactly as 
much capacity as his or her unit can supply in the relevant time frame 
becomes very small as the number of agents who own units increases. 
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Because of lumpiness, then, the total set of resources or goods that have 
these characteristics will usually exhibit slack capacity. This slack will exist 
unless the excess capacity is somehow transferred to fulfill the demand of 
nonowners. Because of the relationship of the increase in the likely 
available slack to the number of unit owners in society, the extent to which 
a good will be mid-grained and shareable in the sense I describe here, rather 
than large grained, like a steam turbine, will depend on the extant wealth in 
a society and its distribution-that is, how many people are able, as 
well as willing, to pay its price. A PC is a shareable good in North America 
and Europe, but may be a large-grained capital good in an Indian or 
Brazilian village. 
The intuitive response, at least for economists, to such endemic 
"overcapacity" of functionality is to create a secondary market in excess 
capacity. For large-grained lumpy goods, like steam engines or hotels, this 
could take the form of a labor market or a hotel room market, respectively, 
where the excess capacity (from the perspective of an individual agent) is 
not excess capacity at all, because the demand is aggregated so as to match 
it to the capacity and smooth out the lumpiness. For mid-grained goods, the 
answer would be a secondary market in capacity so as, once again, to 
smooth out the lumpiness by aggregating and disaggregating demand, thus 
reducing the incongruence between functionality provisioned and 
functionality demanded on a per-unit and per-owner basis. Yard sales and 
eBay are the relevant intuitive examples of such secondary markets. Part III 
will consider the reasons why we might nonetheless see the sharing systems 
that we in fact observe. 
Before I outline the comparative advantages of secondary markets and 
sharing systems, however, we must consider the dynamic effect of any 
system that transfers excess capacity from owners to nonowners. The more 
efficient the sharing or secondary market for excess capacity is, the less of 
an impetus there will be for marginal users to put new units of the goods 
into service, because they will be able to acquire functionality from the 
secondary market or sharing system. As fewer new units come on the 
market and older units are retired, total social capacity declines. When this 
happens, the difference between the ready availability of capacity from 
owning a unit and the constrained availability of capacity from the excess 
capacity market or sharing system will grow. The increasing difference 
between owning a unit and acquiring someone else's excess capacity will, 
in turn, increase the attractiveness of putting an additional unit into service 
for the marginal user, thereby also increasing the amount of excess capacity 
available. 
If there were a perfect secondary market in capacity, the deadweight 
loss created by the overcapacity would be eliminated. Enough units that 
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would generate enough capacity to satisfy demand for the imnctionality 
would be purchased, but no more, and their excess capacity would be 
reallocated to individuals who valued some functionality, but not enough 
to purchase an additional unit. Consider the following simple numerical 
example. Imagine that the marginal cost of a unit is the equivalent of the 
value of a degree of functionality designated as 4f but that because of the 
technical lumpiness, each unit generates a functionality flow of 6f 
Imagine further that the demand for the functionality in society is as 
follows: Five individuals demand a functionality flow of 5f five demand 
4f, five demand 3f, and five demand 2f Total social demand for the 
functionality would be 70f If there were no secondary market or sharing 
system, total social demand for capacity-generating units would be 10 
units (demanded by the ten individuals whose demand equals or exceeds 
the cost of a unit, 4f). Total social supply of functionality from these units 
would be 60f, but only 45f would be consumed by unit owners, and 15f 
would be wasted, while individuals who demand 25f would remain 
unserved. With a perfect secondary market, 12 units would be put into 
operation, generating a total social capacity of 72f, and all users who 
value functionality would be served, with the total social capacity 
exceeding demand by 2f Now, imagine that technology was such that 
each unit generated functionality of 10Of Some of those who bought units 
under the first assumption would refrain from doing so, acquiring units 
instead from the secondary market, and only 7 units would be put in 
operation. The basic point is obvious. Even if units are lumpy, if 
functionality can be transferred costlessly and perfectly from unit owners 
to nonowners, there will be no overcapacity. 
Markets, however, are not perfect. Neither is social exchange. In Part 
III, I describe in detail how transaction costs in general and information 
shortfalls in particular can be integrated into the analysis. The overarching 
intuition is this: Secondary markets and social sharing systems are 
alternative transactional frameworks for transferring the excess capacity of 
units that are in service at a given time. They differ in the transaction costs 
associated with their use, and in particular they differ in the quality of 
information they generate. Which one more efficiently passes through its 
excess capacity to nonowners will determine which will be more efficient 
as a system for managing resources that have these technological 
characteristics. 
D. Shareable Goods: Conclusion 
Goods that meet the focused definitions I offer for shareable goods are 
not rare phenomena in our daily lives. Automobiles come with standard 
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packages of seats, and PCs come with processors and storage disks well 
beyond what most users will require. There are many other such goods. 
Books (rather than their content) are an excellent example. In order to read 
a book one can borrow it from a library or buy it. Once purchased, the book 
has much more capacity to deliver its primary functionality- 
communicating its content-than a single nonobsessive individual can 
consume. This overcapacity is the source of the secondhand book market 
(market provisioning), the public library (state provisioning), and the 
widespread practice of lending books to friends (social provisioning). 
Houses and apartments are a ubiquitous, though muted, instance of 
shareable goods.83 Rooms are sometimes disposed of through markets, as in 
the case of bed and breakfasts, and sometimes through social exchange 
systems, as when guests come to stay overnight or are invited to use one's 
bathroom (itself a nested shareable good). The complex systems of market 
and social provisioning of renewable tissue like blood and sperm, or rapidly 
decaying overprovisioned tissue like ova, can also be understood in terms 
of these forms of tissue having the characteristics of shareable goods, 
capable of being provisioned and exchanged either through markets or 
through social systems. Finally, toys are shareable goods, and provide the 
first and central mode of cultural transmission of the values of sharing the 
excess capacities of one's possessions. Anyone who sits in a New York 
City playground can only marvel at the paradoxical phenomenon of Wall 
Street traders admonishing their children to "share nicely," and will 
appreciate our deep cultural commitment to sharing some of our private, 
rival possessions as a mode of social provisioning. 
III. SHARING AND MARKETS: TRANSACTION COSTS AND MOTIVATIONS 
Market-based systems84 (both the price system and firms), the state, 
and social relations provide different transactional frameworks through 
83. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Household: The Law, Economics, and Sociology of an 
Underexamined Institution (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/gbaker/oes/ 
papers/HouseholdHarvMIT.pdf. 
84. A methodological (or perhaps metaphorical) note is due. One often hears people speaking 
of "a market in reputation" or "a market in which people compete for esteem." It is important o 
recognize that such statements are metaphors. Markets as actual institutional forms are a very 
particular information process, generating information in a very particular form--prices. Other 
modalities of allowing unorganized individuals to decide on their actions without hierarchical 
coordination, even if they are fuilly distributed and atomistic in style, but that rely on other 
institutional forms and social practices, are not "markets," except metaphorically. The metaphor is 
a bad one if it leads us to ignore the fact that on any given question of institutional design, there 
may be different answers depending on whether we think that the most effective system would 
utilize prices or, for example, esteem. 
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which individuals can act.85 Each has different setup costs. Each has 
different marginal transaction costs. Each also, independently but 
cumulatively, has a different reward structure. The combined effect of the 
motivational effects and the transaction costs of each system will 
determine, for any given good or use, whether it will most efficiently be 
provisioned through the price system, a firm, a bureaucracy, or a social 
sharing and exchange system. This Part sets to one side the possibility of 
state provisioning and focuses on comparing social relations to market- 
based systems. I first work through the transaction costs analysis, then the 
question of motivation, and finally combine them, with a particular focus 
on goods that have the characteristics of contemporary computation and 
communications devices. 
A. Transaction Costs 
1. Choosing a Transactional Framework 
An agent considering whether or not to allow others to use his or her 
resources must go through a decision pattern as described in Figure 1. Each 
decision can be understood as a cost-benefit analysis that compares each of 
the modalities of the use and exchange of resources-market, state, and 
social relations-in terms of (1) the transaction costs, under given 
technological and legal conditions, in the act of complete or partial 
exclusion and (2) the comparative opportunity costs of inclusion and 
exclusion. Because I am concerned here with the decisions of agents with 
regard to privately owned goods and resources, I will ignore state-based 
options for disposition, although the shape of the comparative analysis is 
similar. The tree illustrates that the basic decision of whether or not to 
transact based on a comparison of the transaction costs and the likely 
benefits of transacting involves not one choice between two options 
(transact/not transact) but a series of choices among a variety of actions, 
ranging from no exclusion to perfect exclusion with no transaction, and 
85. Note that this tripartite typology is similar to but not the same as the tripartite description 
of organizations one finds in the discussion of nonprofits. See supra note 4. The difference is that 
investor firmnns, onprofits, and government agencies are all organizational forms of action. My 
focus here is more general, and applies to individual domains of action. Nonprofits of the type 
Henry Hansmann calls "commercial" can work through markets, such as by selling services in 
competition with for-profits. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 840-41. For-profit firms can use 
social relations, by leveraging the social capital of their employees. See NAN LIN, SOCIAL 
CAPITAL: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ACTION 19-28 (2001); James S. Coleman, 
Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. (SUPPLEMENT: ORGS. & 
INSTITUTIONS) S95, S108 (1988) (describing how employers and employees in the printing 
industry used the social capital embedded in the Monotype Club as an employment referral 
service). 
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including a variety of alternatives for partial exclusion. Different options 
for exclusion and different strategies for inclusion will entail different 
transaction costs. 
FIGURE 1. DECISION TO EXCLUDE 
Agent / resource 
Exclusion No exclusion 
(woodlands in upstate New York) 




(first come, first served, 
e.g., Internet routers, peer- 
to-peer clients, body- 
snatchers and slugs) 
Social Market 
(carpooling, distributed (jitneys, priced distributed computing: 
computing, dinner parties) any priced transaction selects among 
those willing and able to pay and those 
not willing or able) 
The first choice point is between some form of exclusion and no 
exclusion. 
No exclusion. Simply leaving the resource open to anyone's use-no 
fences, no guards, no contracts, etc.-is likely to be the lowest-transaction- 
cost option. However, it is likely to be the highest-cost alternative in terms 
of congestion costs-opportunity costs incurred by the owner whenever her 
failure to exclude anyone from the good causes her not to have her unit of 
the good available for her own use. Congestion costs may be high or low, 
depending on the nature of the good and the pattern of demand for it. 
Privately owned woodlands in New Hampshire or upstate New York may 
be sufficiently abundant, use by hikers and hunters sufficiently sparse, and 
fencing sufficiently costly that de facto open-access policies may be most 
efficient for individual landowners to adopt. Otherwise, the owner will 
choose some form of exclusion. 
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The second choice is between perfect exclusion and partial exclusion. 
Perfect exclusion. Under perfect exclusion, the owner allows no one 
else to use his goods. The direct transaction costs of perfect exclusion are 
likely higher than those of no exclusion, but may be higher or lower than 
those of partial exclusion. Sometimes, perfect exclusion may be cheaper 
than partial exclusion-as when one need only build a strong fence to 
exclude all but must also have a guard at the gate to admit and exclude 
different people. Other times, however, perfect exclusion may be harder to 
achieve than partial exclusion, if every discrete act of exclusion requires an 
independent investment-as when a hunter in a hunter-gatherer society 
needs to fend off each new claimant to the spoils of the hunt. This latter 
characteristic underlies the claims of the tolerated theft model in behavioral 
ecology. This model suggests that sometimes hunters or foragers permit 
others to share in their catch, without a common social framework of 
sharing and gift giving and without expectation of reciprocity or the 
acquisition of social status. Instead, there is "tolerated theft," in the sense 
that others take from the good with no expectation of retaliation or of 
reciprocation. This occurs, within that framework of analysis, when the cost 
of perfect exclusion is higher than the gains from perfect exclusion.86 This 
descriptive phenomenon is also recognized-though not interpreted through 
the prism of methodological individualism-as "demand sharing" by 
anthropologists who study sharing practices from a cultural perspective.87 
This form of sharing becomes a form of partial sharing, rather than of "open 
access," because the owner will not tolerate everyone, only those within a 
group that is sufficiently large to prevent outsiders from accessing the 
shared good. 
Whether or not perfect exclusion is more expensive to implement than 
partial exclusion, it is clear that one of the costs of perfect exclusion is the 
opportunity cost of partial inclusion. In the case of shareable goods of the 
type we discuss here, which have an overcapacity relative to the individual 
owner's needs, the owner has an opportunity to benefit if she can get any 
positive utility from allowing access to the excess capacity. This is so 
whether the utility takes the form of economic returns in a secondary 
market, cost avoidance by permitting open access, social and psychological 
returns in social sharing arrangements, or the simple pleasure of fulfilling a 
taste for altruism. 
86. See Bird & Bird, supra note 81; N.C. Blurton Jones, A Selfish Origin for Human Food 
Sharing: Tolerated Theft, 5 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 1 (1984); David Sloan Wilson, 
Hunting, Sharing, and Multilevel Selection: The Tolerated-Theft Model Revisited, 39 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 73 (1998); Bruce Winterhalder, A Marginal Model of Tolerated Theft, 17 
ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 37 (1996). 
87. See Carrier, supra note 6. 
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Partial exclusion. This represents a cluster of strategies that are the 
most interesting from our perspective. These entail permitting some set of 
others who are not the owner to use the resource, but nonetheless limiting 
the set of permitted users to some number less than anyone who wants it. 
Nonselective partial exclusion. This option refers to the simplest 
approach to partial exclusion. Under this category, the selection criterion is 
unrelated to the characteristics or choices of the owner or the users 
permitted to use the good. Instead, the total amount shared is set by the 
capacity of the good, the demand of the owner-which together determine 
the amount of unused and available capacity-and some nonspecific 
selection criterion. "First come, first served" is a simple example of such a 
sharing algorithm. The Northern Virginia corridor practice of body 
snatchers and slugs is a form of nonselective partial exclusion on a first- 
come-first-served basis. Similarly, the Internet Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) manages the capacity of routers on a nonselective, partial 
exclusion basis. This protocol calls for every router to forward all packets 
that arrive at it on a first-come-first-served basis and manages congestion 
by dropping later packets if they arrive when it is overloaded. The dropped 
packets cause the senders' machines to back off, slow down, and try other 
routes. Other, more elaborate algorithms can be defined, but will still be 
nonselective as long as they do not rely on characteristics that are specific 
to individuals who are seeking permission to use the excess capacity. That 
the individuals need not be determined on a case-by-case basis is likely to 
lower the transaction costs involved in instantiating the partial permission 
framework. The primary cost of nonselective partial exclusion is the 
opportunity cost of the gains from selective exclusion. 
Selective exclusion-market selection. This is the secondary market 
option. The owner of the unit that produces welfare-enhancing functionality 
allows those who pay market prices to gain access to the functionality and 
excludes those who do not pay. This option is typified by the costs 
commonly associated with market transactions. These include defining the 
property and use rights, specifying the uses permitted and contracting for 
them, metering the functionality used, and monitoring and enforcing 
compliance. We have long understood transaction costs to be sufficiently 
nontrivial to affect the choice of how the economy organizes access to and 
use of resources.88 
Selective exclusion-social selection. Under this option, the owner 
excludes many putative users of the functionality and only permits use by 
88. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). This is, after all, the point for which Ronald 
Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
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those who meet the owner's social criteria. This obviously includes the 
lobster gangs in Maine that James Acheson described in the early common 
property regime literature89 and the socially selective swimming pools and 
golf clubs often analyzed in the club goods literature.90 It also includes wide 
ranges of normal human experience: sharing the refrigerator with one's 
household members and invited guests but not with others, inviting an 
acquaintance but not a stranger to share one's usufruct in the table at the 
caf6, etc. Once one begins to define the various forms of temporary or 
stable proprietary-type interests we have in the things in the world around 
us, and to couple them with the pervasive social sharing practices we use- 
some of which may be purely redistributive, some reciprocal, some 
voluntary, some obligation based within a given set of social 
understandings-one sees that social sharing is ubiquitous in everyday life. 
Like markets, social exchange systems entail transaction costs. These 
may include the definition of social norms, the definition and policing of 
social group boundaries-who is in and who is out-and the monitoring 
and enforcement of the terms of social sharing, which has been the subject 
of much empirical literature on the willingness of individuals to incur costs 
to enforce reciprocity and compliance with other social expectations.91 Just 
as we have pervasive, longstanding investments in enabling markets-like 
building and maintaining a legal system, a fiscal system, and physical 
marketplaces-so too do we have standing investments in social sharing, 
ranging from widespread cultural schooling in socially acceptable and 
desirable behavior (like teaching children to share their toys in the sandbox) 
to the gossips who shame individuals into compliance. 
2. The General Shape of Transaction-Costs-Based Choice Among 
Frameworks 
It is now fairly simple to outline the shape of (though not necessarily to 
perform) comparative transaction costs analysis of the choice among these 
various strategies for disposing of the excess capacity of shareable goods. 
When all forms of exclusion are more costly than permitting everyone 
to use the resource, owners will simply allow others to use the goods or 
resources they own. When the costs of either permitting everyone to use the 
89. See ACHESON, supra note 77. 
90. See supra note 76. 
91. See ERNST FEHR & KLAUS M. SCHMIDT, THEORIES OF FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY: 
EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of 
Zurich, Working Paper No. 75, 2001); FREY & MEIER, supra note 2; KAHAN, supra note 2; 
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 ECON. J. F419 
(2002); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 2002 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 687 (2002). 
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resource or good or of sharing it are greater than the cost of simple perfect 
exclusion, owners will simply exclude everyone from the good. Given that 
"the cost" includes opportunity costs caused by congestion, and that for 
perfectly private-rival and nonrenewable-goods, "congestion" means 
loss of the full value of the good to its owner, this condition would be 
fulfilled for perfectly private goods that are more valuable than the cost of 
exclusion. This also includes the Coasean insight that where entitlements 
are initially inefficiently defined, but the cost of implementing selective 
market exclusion to find the more efficient allocation is greater than the 
cost, including opportunity cost, of perfect exclusion-that is, of retaining 
entitlements where they began-perfect exclusion will be chosen and 
entitlements will remain where initially assigned. But it also maps the 
limitation of that insight that characterizes the social norms literature. The 
fact that the market-based transactional framework may be too costly to 
transact around inefficiently delineated entitlements does not necessarily 
mean the same is true of social relations-based transactional frameworks. 
Social norms may shift around the entitlements if transacting around the 
entitlements through the social system is less costly than doing so through 
the market, in which case the inefficiency need not be solved by state or 
judicial intervention to reallocate the entitlements.92 
When the costs, including the opportunity cost, of refusing to exclude 
anyone, or refusing to permit anyone to use the good, are greater than the 
costs of one or the other form of selective exclusion, selective exclusion 
will occur. When the costs of market selection are greater than the costs of 
social selection, social sharing will occur, and when the costs of social 
sharing are greater than the costs of market selection, market selection will 
occur.93 As Henry Smith has shown, this tradeoff and choice need not be 
singular for an entire resource. Different uses of the same physical resource 
may be subject to property-based market arrangements and commons-based 
social arrangements, mixed in what he called semicommons.94 
Evaluating competing approaches toward harnessing the excess 
capacity exhibited by shareable goods requires a comparison of perfect 
exclusion and partial exclusion, and then of nonselective and selective 
(market or social) partial exclusion. That is, we should seek to answer why 
and when it may be more costly for people not to share at all, and then to 
92. Indeed, this has been a core claim of the social norms literature for almost twenty years. 
See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle.: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). 
93. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) (describing the prevalence of commons-based 
systems and property-based systems as a function of comparative transaction costs of each). 
94. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
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answer why and when it may be more or less costly to exclude on some 
nonselective model, as opposed to sharing socially or participating in a 
secondary market for excess capacity. 
First, recall that there is some subset of agents who own shareable 
goods who only use up part of the capacity of their goods and do not 
require or cannot absorb more of it. Giving that excess capacity away is 
costless to them, except for the transaction costs. This means that they 
should prefer to have their excess capacity used rather than be idle 
whenever there is any positive utility to them from its use, minus the cost of 
sharing or reselling it. If the costs of perfect exclusion are equal to the costs 
of partial exclusion, then the owners of shareable goods will choose to 
exclude only partially whenever there is any positive utility to sharing. It is 
trivial that if we assume that the cost of perfect exclusion is always higher 
than the cost of partial exclusion, whether selective or not, then the owner 
will permit some use of her good as long as the disutility from sharing is no 
greater than the difference in exclusion costs. And where the costs of partial 
exclusion are higher than the costs of perfect exclusion, the owner will 
share or resell her excess capacity when the utility from sharing or reselling 
will exceed the difference in cost between partial exclusion and perfect 
exclusion. 
Second, we have fairly extensive studies of the costs of the two forms 
of selective exclusion. The transaction costs literature analyzes the sources 
and types of transaction costs.95 The cluster of literatures concerned with 
various nonmarket mechanisms-social trust and reciprocity,96 common 
property regimes,97 gift and exchange anthropology98-offers us insight 
into the sources and scope of "transaction costs" associated with social 
selective exclusion. I assume that selective partial exclusion will always 
have higher information costs than nonselective partial exclusion because 
the former will always require more information about specific transactions 
in order to implement the selection criterion, whereas any nonselective 
95. See, e.g., R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (defining the 
relevant costs as "'search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs'" (quoting Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem ofExternality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 
148 (1979))); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 
611, 614-16 (1989) (offering a functional taxonomy of transaction costs, including get-together 
costs, decision and execution costs, and information costs). Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed explicitly point out that exclusion costs are a part of negotiation costs-leaving unstated 
but obvious that enforcing the prebargaining entitlements is crucial to defining what is to be 
gained and transferred in the transaction itself. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1095 (1971). 
96. See supra note 91. 
97. See supra note 77. 
98. See supra note 6. 
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algorithm that can be applied mechanically will require a minimal amount 
of information-that a transaction is sought. Selective partial exclusion will 
therefore only outperform nonselective partial exclusion when the 
selectivity provides some positive return as compared to nonselective 
partial exclusion. This is trivial in the case of markets because the selection 
criterion is willingness and ability to pay, and payment must be more than 
the cost of distinguishing those willing to pay more from those willing to 
pay less. Similarly, in the social exclusion model, the social rewards of 
selectivity must exceed the added cost of selection. Bestowing a benefit on 
loved ones is probably the most common benefit for social selectivity, as 
we prefer our family and friends to strangers when we decide to whom we 
will lend our car or book. 
Imagine a small swimming pool in a backyard. The cost of perfect 
exclusion is the cost of building a fence at the perimeter (given a 
background investment in legal enforcement of and respect for property 
rights). This is nontrivial but not high. This cost is higher than the direct 
cost of permitting free access by not putting up a fence. But given 
congestion costs, displacement, dirt, risk of liability, and so on, the option 
of open access is probably more costly than the option of perfect exclusion. 
The cost of partial exclusion includes (1) the cost of perfect exclusion plus 
(2) the cost of selective admission. It is, then, greater than the cost of 
perfect exclusion. Selective admission will nonetheless be granted when its 
return is higher than the added cost. Admitting friends and family members 
is relatively low cost. It is easy to identify and differentiate those who have 
permission from those who do not, and doing so requires little or no 
additional monitoring, contracting, or enforcement costs because it relies on 
a preexisting set of social relations that exist independently of the decision 
to admit to the swimming pool. The rewards are social-psychological in 
nature, and perhaps reciprocal for in-kind exchanges. Admitting strangers 
who are willing to pay is more expensive. It requires identification, 
contracting, collection, and enforcement. Rewards are, obviously, 
monetary. Given the small size of the pool and its likely rapid congestion, 
there is a low ceiling on the monetary rewards obtainable from market- 
based admission. While thoroughly culture- and class-specific, the example 
offers an intuitive sense of the shape of the analysis involved. 
A similar framework can be mapped onto our motivating problems: 
carpooling and Internet-based distributed computing. In both cases, the 
marginal cost of perfect exclusion for any given time frame is negligible. 
Both types of goods have built-in exclusion mechanisms as part of the 
lumpy "unit," be they door locks or an operating system that requires a 
user's initiation to run programs on the processor. Both could suffer 
substantial congestion costs, as well as degradation, if given over to open 
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sharing. Both are therefore only likely to be shared, if at all, on a partial 
exclusion basis. In both cases the primary perceived cost of nonselective 
partial exclusion is security, be it picking up hitchhikers on a first-come- 
first-served basis or allowing anyone who wishes to run any program he or 
she wishes on one's computer. 
Otherwise, the comparative costs of selective versus nonselective 
partial exclusion are more ambiguous. Which of the two approaches will fill 
three or four empty seats in a commuter car more efficiently? Will a habit 
of picking up at one or two meeting points decrease the marginal 
coordination cost such that it will be lower than stopping for the first 
hitchhiker, and will it be sufficiently low cost to outperform a stable set of 
commuting relationships, as is the case with slugging? Which approach, 
selective or nonselective partial exclusion, will require greater intervention 
on the part of the computer's owner to assure that the resource is shared up 
to, but not beyond, the excess capacity? For example, in the case of WiFi 
access points-currently the most popular standard for wireless Internet 
access-the owner of the gateway (the device that connects the home 
wireless network to the cable or DSL modem) can easily set the gateway to 
full sharing, enabling any user to connect automatically. Selectively 
admitting only some users requires the owner either to select a password 
and provide it to all whom the owner wishes to admit, and those others to 
change their configurations to meet this one access point, or to get unique 
identifying numbers of each admitted user and exclude others. For WiFi 
access points, then, perfect exclusion, open sharing, and selective exclusion 
are all feasible. Indeed, we observe commercial WiFi hotspots and 
password-protected WiFi gateways shared with friends, but also an 
increasingly dense network of openly shared access points in major cities 
like New York and San Francisco,99 suggesting that many owners decline to 
incur the costs of selective exclusion. For automobiles and for personal 
computers, perfect exclusion is a simple and cheap choice, open sharing is 
not a strong contender, and partial exclusion is possible both nonselectively 
(picking up any hitchhiker or slug on a first-come-first-served basis, sharing 
storage with other participants in a peer-to-peer file sharing network like 
KaZaa) and selectively, through means either market or social (taxis and 
carpools, project-specific CPU-cycle sales like G6mez Performance 
Networks and donations like SETI@home or Folding@home). 
99. See, for example, the far-from-complete database lists for New York City, The Wireless 
Node Database Project, http://www.nodedb.com/unitedstates/ny/newyork (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004); and San Francisco, The Wireless Node Database Project, http://www.nodedb.com/ 
unitedstates/ca/san_francisco (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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3. Transaction Costs Analysis of Markets and Sharing 
Both markets and social exchange are forms of selective exclusion. 
They share many of the basic costs of physical exclusion, dictated by the 
technology related to the resource in question and its use. The primary 
systematic differences between the transaction costs of these two forms of 
selective exclusion are related to information and enforcement costs. 
Different transactional frameworks perform differently in terms of the 
information they allow participants to gain about what resources are 
available, how they function, how desirable their function is, etc. Markets 
use a combination of the price system and managerial hierarchical reporting 
and command flows to manage information about the universe of potential 
actions on resources in the world. Social frameworks use social cues that 
are usually less formal and less focused on crisply delineating the 
alternative courses of action open to participants in these frameworks. In 
this Subsection, I focus on the implications of this difference in the 
crispness and formality of information flows within markets and firms, on 
the one hand, and social relations, on the other. 
The other main transaction cost difference between markets and social 
sharing systems is enforcement costs. Assuming the information has been 
generated in each system, markets rely more heavily (though not 
exclusively) on formal enforcement, while social relations rely on informal 
enforcement mechanisms studied in the literature on social norms and 
reciprocity. Which will be more costly depends on how costly punishing is 
in the social system relative to the enforcement process for property and 
contract claims in the particular market, how well developed the market or 
legal system is relative to the relevant social system, and so on. These are 
largely empirical questions that I will not further pursue here. 
a. Crispness 
A market transaction, in order to be efficient, must be clearly 
demarcated as to what it includes so that it can be priced efficiently. That 
price must then be paid in equally crisply delineated currency. Even if a 
transaction may initially be declared to involve sale of "an amount 
reasonably required to produce the required output" for a price "ranging 
from x to y," at some point what was provided and what is owed must be 
crystallized and fixed for a formal exchange. The crispness is a functional 
requirement of the price system, which derives from the precision and 
formality of the medium of exchange-currency-and the ambition to 
provide refined representations of the comparative value of marginal 
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decisions through denomination in the exchange medium that represents 
these incremental value differences. 
Social exchange, on the other hand, does not require the same degree of 
crispness. As Maurice Godelier put it, "[T]he mark of the gift between close 
friends and relatives . .. is not the absence of obligations, it is the absence 
of 
'calculation."'•00 There are, obviously, elaborate and formally ritualistic 
systems of social exchange, in societies both ancient and modem. There are 
common property regimes that monitor and record calls on the common 
pool very crisply. These tend to resemble markets and market-based firms 
as the crispness increases.101 But in many of the common property regimes 
one finds mechanisms for bounding or fairly allocating access to the 
common pool that more coarsely delineate the entitlements, behaviors, and 
consequences.102 In modern market society, where money is a formal 
medium of precise exchange and where social relations are more fluid than 
in traditional societies, social exchange is certainly a fuzzier medium of 
exchange. In many cultures, generosity is understood as imposing a debt of 
obligation, but neither the precise amount of value given nor the precise 
nature of the debt to be repaid or its date of repayment need necessarily be 
specified.103 Actions enter into a cloud of good will or membership, out of 
which each agent can understand himself as being entitled to a certain flow 
of dependencies or benefits in exchange for continued cooperative 
behavior. This flow may be an ongoing relationship between two people, 
sharing among members of a small group like a family or circle of friends, 
and more broadly, the general level of generosity among strangers that 
makes for a decent society. 
100. GODELIER, supra note 6, at 5. 
101. A classic extreme case of a system described as a "commons" arrangement that seemed 
to be more of a market in scrip than a common property regime was the case of water scrip in 
Alicante, Spain. As Ostrom described that irrigation system, water availability was divided up into 
increments of fractions of minutes of open irrigation gates, represented by paper scrip, for which 
there was a highly liquid market, facilitated by both auctions and two-party exchanges, and which 
was used as collateral and as an otherwise fungible medium of exchange. See OSTROM, supra note 
77, at 78-82. 
102. Acheson's classic study of the lobster gangs of Maine, ACHESON, supra note 77, for 
example, describes a much coarser and more collectivist system of entitlements than those of 
Alicante. There, harbor gangs' entitlements were collective to a fishing area broadly defined. 
Internal division was usufruct based, leaving substantial room for internal allocation on a 
combination of unilateral action-each fisherman could "grab" within limits-and social 
standing--older, more respected fishermen had better locations somewhat reserved to them 
without grabbing. Similarly, the time-division techniques used in Swiss pastures that Ostrom 
describes have a coarser outline than the Alicante scrip system or even the other, more closely 
policed Spanish irrigation systems she describes. See OSTROM, supra note 77, at 61-65. 
103. See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral 
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 73 (2001) 
(suggesting that this type of indebtedness is responsible for an unusually high rejection rate of 
offers in a wide-ranging dictator game experiment, in those cultures where receiving gifts was 
most clearly associated with unpredictable indebtedness). 
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The point is that social exchange does not require precise terms like, "I 
will lend you my car and help you move these five boxes on Monday, and 
in exchange you will feed my fish next July," while markets would require 
terms like, "I will move five boxes on Tuesday for $100 and six boxes for 
$120." This does not mean that social systems are cost free-far from it. 
They require tremendous investment, acculturation, and maintenance, every 
bit as much as markets or states do. Once functional, however, social 
exchanges require less crispness at the margin. Both social and market 
exchange systems entail large fixed costs-the setting up of legal 
institutions and enforcement systems for markets and the setting up of 
social networks, norms, and institutions for social exchange. Once these 
initial costs have been invested, however, market transactions 
systematically require a greater degree of precise information about the 
content of actions, goods, and obligations, and greater precision of 
monitoring and enforcement on a per-transaction basis than do social 
exchange systems. 
Because the difference in cost is at the margin per transaction, it 
increases linearly with the number of discrete transactions necessary to 
obtain a sufficient quantum of functionality flow to achieve the goals of a 
person relying on functionality flows from the owners of units. In other 
words, imagine that in order to run one computation one needs the excess 
capacity of only one computer, and the difference in transaction costs 
between using market-based clearance and social exchange is one dollar. If, 
instead, in order to run one computation the person seeking to use the 
excess capacity of others needs to pool the excess processing power of two 
idle computers, then the cost difference is two dollars per computation, and 
so forth. This pattern suggests that when slack capacity is located in small 
quanta distributed among many owners, it becomes increasingly more 
costly to harness that excess capacity through markets than through social 
exchange systems. Each additional processor, wireless node, or similar unit 
added through a social transaction framework requires less information 
exchange than it would have had that same node been added through a 
market-based system, because the social transaction need not exchange the 
crisp information required for efficient pricing and contracting. Given that 
the interest of each individual owner to buy as little excess capacity as 
technically feasible places a downward pressure on the expected amount of 
each unit's excess capacity, many shareable goods are likely to have this 
characteristic-widespread distribution of excess capacity in smallish 
dollops. This is precisely the domain in which shareable goods become very 
interesting as objects of social sharing, rather than market exchange-the 
domain of carpooling, distributed computing, file sharing, and ad hoc mesh 
wireless networks. 
318 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
b. Rendering Requirements and Lossiness 
Both markets and state-based production have rendering requirements 
that are "lossy" in comparison to social production and exchange systems. 
That is, they lose information in the translation-from the way the world is 
perceived by the agents most immediately affected by it and most capable 
of acting, to the language in which the decision must be rendered given the 
requirements of the decision mechanism used to direct the action. 
Each modality of production has its own ways of encoding, storing, and 
transmitting information from those observing the conditions and 
opportunities for action to those calculating the comparative attractiveness 
of possible actions and deciding what action should be taken-be they 
centralized or distributed, be it from the eyes to the brain or from the 
sentries to the general. This takes the form of prices in the market, of 
reports to management in firms, or of administrative reports in the state. In 
these cases, the actual richness of the world is transposed into formally 
structured modalities of representation whose logic is defined by the 
internal requirements of representation and processing in the system into 
which the information is fed-be it price in the market, managerial decision 
in the firm, or administrative decision in the state. 
By contrast, information about social relations relies not on formal 
structure but on tacit, learned, and culturally reproduced capacities to read 
and interpret social settings. This may well present problems of clarity, 
comparability, and formal computability of problems, but it allows more 
"analog," storytelling-like modalities of communicating information with 
great subtlety and nuance. Social communications are more textured than 
the more formal systems of organizing information in market and state 
production. The texture can come from direct express communication about 
details, as opposed to translation into prices or formal categories, or from 
narratives that tap into culturally accessible reasons for action ("help fight 
AIDS," "find extraterrestrial life"). It can also come from observation of 
others or of the context of action understood through a common cultural 
filter that allows the observer to treat the actions or observed facts about the 
world as legible and intelligible cues about context, reasons for action, and 
desirability of action. Texture also comes from practice and from the tacit 
learning or information acquisition that occurs as part of practice in and 
adaptation to the social and material environment. 
The tradeoff between formal clarity and computability on the one hand 
and texture on the other suggests that social systems will be relatively 
weaker in organizing actions for which there are clear, computable, but fine 
differences between alternative courses of action. Conversely, social 
systems will be particularly valuable as information-processing systems 
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where the context, precise nature of the alternative possible actions, and 
range of possible outcomes are persistently vague or difficult to specify 
formally.104 To the extent that information about production opportunities, 
cooperative actions, and motivational inputs can be represented effectively 
through social communications systems, the result would offer a more 
complete statement of the factors relevant to agents' decisions than would 
information available in systems-like the state and the market-that 
require formalization of the data so that they can be represented adequately 
for the particular process of computation necessary to a decision in those 
systems.105 This is particularly important under conditions of persistent 
uncertainty (where uncertainty cannot be eliminated at an acceptable cost). 
104. The value of nonmarket systems in the presence of high uncertainty is not original here. 
Kenneth Arrow mentions it, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
343, 351-57 (1972) [hereinafter Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges], as an explanation for Richard 
Titmuss's finding that market-based blood is more tainted than donated blood. For a more 
complete discussion of the Titmuss-Arrow debate, see infra Section III.B. Arrow also mentions it 
as a reason that nonprofit hospitals may be better than for-profit hospitals. See Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). Henry 
Hansmann developed this latter position into a full-blown theory of the comparative advantage of 
nonprofits: 
[N]onprofit firms commonly arise where customers are in a peculiarly poor position to 
determine, with reasonable cost or effort, the quality or the quantity of the services they 
receive from a firm. As a consequence, assigning ownership to anyone other than these 
customers would create both the incentive and the opportunity for the customers to be 
severely exploited. Yet at the same time, the customers are so situated that the costs to 
them of exercising effective control over the firm are unacceptably large relative to the 
value of their transactions with the firm. The solution is to create a firm without 
owners---or, more accurately, to create a firm whose managers hold it in trust for their 
customers. In essence, the nonprofit form abandons any benefits of full ownership in 
favor of stricter fiduciary constraints on management. 
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 228 (1996). These claims about nonprofit 
and nonmarket donation and uncertainty differ from my own focus in one crucial way. Both 
Arrow and Hansmann locate the "fix" that nonprofits or nonmarket actors provide in the 
alignment of incentives of the agents and "principals" or "customers." In the case of nonprofits, 
the nondistribution constraint means that no class of "owner"-patrons governs the firm and can 
capture the gains from exploiting the ill-informed class of patrons, and hence there is no class 
whose interests are severely misaligned with the potentially exploitable class. In the case of Arrow 
and blood donation, without payment for tainted blood, the donative motivation to help others no 
longer drives the person with disease-carrying blood to provide it. My own focus here is not on 
the alignment of incentives when operating through a market (though nothing in my approach 
denies this effect), but on the idea that embedding an uncertain transaction in social exchange 
introduces social signals into the transaction, thereby reducing uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. It is not only aligning incentives that is at stake, but also freeing the transaction from 
the strictures of price-mediated information exchange, which improves the quality of action in the 
face of uncertainty. 
105. Note that, to the extent that a nonprofit is run like a firm and interacts with its "patrons" 
as a firm would, it would not have this uncertainty-reduction characteristic. It is when nonmarket 
behavior occurs through social interactions among individual participants that socially legible 
information can be communicated. A market-based actor who can communicate socially (a "chic" 
nightclub) will reduce uncertainty (as to whether to go into this club or that, or whether to go to a 
club or stay at home), while a nonmarket actor communicating bureaucratically or through market 
pricing will not. 
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Presumably, there will be ranges where decisions could be improved by 
formal representation and computation, ranges where these will 
systematically fail to represent all factors relevant to an agent, and ranges 
where any two or three of the systems could render the decisions clearly 
enough for a decision-easy cases-where their comparative advantage 
must be found elsewhere. 
c. Decentralized Systems and Information 
Finally, the phenomenon I focus on in this Essay is systematically 
decentralized. Shareable goods are private goods controlled by their private 
owners, shared in broad social patterns among more or less weakly related 
individuals-much as idealized markets (and some actual markets, like 
eBay) might work. In this, they are different from many, though not all, 
real-world market-based production processes, which tend to be more 
centralized in firms, and from state bureaucracies. 
The "centralized/distributed" distinction as I use it here is not binary. It 
is a range property of systems of human action in context. It describes the 
distance between the occurrence of an opportunity for human action in an 
environment and the authority for directing whether and how the agent 
confronted with the opportunity will act on it. "Distance" describes any 
parameter that separates the authority from the capacity to identify the 
presence of, and act on, the opportunity-organizational and institutional 
characteristics, geographic distance, technical constraints of information 
and authorization flow, etc. The more a system is organized centrally, the 
more room there is for information loss between the actual state of the 
world as perceived by those agents closest to the opportunity for action and 
the state of the world as perceived by agents with authority to decide that an 
action should be undertaken, and vice versa. Any system, whether a market- 
based firm, a state-based bureaucracy, or a social organization like the 
Catholic Church, can be centralized. So too can there be distributed models 
of production in each, though in the case of the state, the formal constraints 
of accountability and legal authority constrain true devolution of state 
power to individual agents who act on the state's behalf. 
Decentralized systems trade information for control. The more 
uncertainty there is about the best courses of action for any given agent or 
group of agents, the more valuable is information relative to the value of 
control. This is the basic claim in favor of ideal markets in comparison to 
command-and-control systems. To the extent that shareable goods are 
shared in practices that are closer to the distributed end of the spectrum, we 
have additional reason to think that sharing in social production systems 
loses less information: Distributed systems in general lose less information. 
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To the extent they "compete" not with decentralized market actors 
functioning through ideal markets but with more centralized firms, 
particularly in regulated industries like telecommunications and the 
copyright- and patent-dependent industries so prevalent in the networked 
information environment, they can provide substantial information 
efficiencies. This overarching claim about sharing systems captures within 
it the many empirical claims about local knowledge, active monitoring and 
enforcement, etc. that have been made on behalf of common property 
regimes and community-production systems in the literature that has 
described and explained the sustainability and, indeed, efficiency, of these 
non-market-based organizational forms.106 
B. Motivation 
Institutional analysis based on transaction costs normally stops here- 
identifying and comparing transaction costs across institutional settings. 
There is, however, another, independent dimension to understanding 
sharing: motivation. The organizers of distributed computing projects, for 
example, explicitly focus on how to motivate contributions.107 Practitioners 
of free software development, o8 as well as the academics who study 
them,109 similarly spend a good bit of energy studying motivations. One 
question is the source and form of nonmonetary rewards. The other is the 
question of crowding out-that is, whether the presence of market-based, 
monetary rewards for an action undermines or improves nonmonetary 
motivations for that action. 
The theoretical and empirical debate over whether monetary 
motivations and some set of social-psychological motivations crowd each 
other out emerged initially in the debates of the early 1970s over blood- 
collection policy. Until the early 1970s, the vast majority of blood donors in 
the United States were compensated in cash or indirectly, via some type of 
blood exchange or insurance system."' In a major work, Richard Titmuss 
106. See OSTROM, supra note 77; Bowles & Gintis, supra note 91. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76. 
108. See Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2, 1998, 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/raymond/; 
Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the 
Noosphere, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 5, 1998, http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_ 0/raymond/. 
109. See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002). Eric von Hippel in particular has provided both theoretical and 
empirical support for the importance of the use value gained by users in a user-driven innovation 
environment, both in software and elsewhere. See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User 
Communities: Learning from Open-Source Software, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 2001, 
at 82. 
110. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY 94 (1971); see also DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD: AN EPIC HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND 
322 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
compared the U.S. and British blood-supply systems, the former largely 
commercial at the time, organized by a mix of private for-profit and 
nonprofit actors, the latter entirely voluntary and organized by the National 
Health Service. Titmuss found that the British system had higher-quality 
blood, as measured by the likelihood of recipients contracting hepatitis 
from transfusions;"' less blood waste; and fewer blood shortages at 
hospitals. Titmuss also attacked the U.S. system as inequitable, arguing that 
the rich exploited the poor and desperate by buying their blood. He 
concluded that an altruistic blood-procurement system is both more ethical 
and more efficient than a market system, and recommended that the market 
be kept out of blood donation to protect the right to give.'12 
Titmuss's argument came under immediate attack from economists. 
Most relevant for our purposes here, Kenneth Arrow agreed that the 
differences in blood quality indicated that the U.S. blood system was 
flawed, but rejected Titmuss's central theoretical claim that markets reduce 
donative activity."3 Arrow reported the alternative hypothesis held by 
"economists typically," that if some people respond to exhortation or moral 
incentives (donors) while others respond to prices and market incentives 
(sellers), these two groups likely behave independently-neither esponds 
to the other's incentives.114 Thus the decision to allow or ban markets 
should have no effect on donative behavior-though removing a market 
could in fact remove incentives of the "bad blood" suppliers to give blood, 
thereby improving the overall quality of the blood supply."5 Titmuss's 
work had not established his hypothesis analytically, Arrow argued, and its 
COMMERCE 174-75 (1998) (explaining that fees for blood donors were approximately twenty-five 
dollars per pint in the late 1940s). 
111. In the United Kingdom, this rate was less than 1%, and in one study was as low as 
0.16%. TITMUSS, supra note 110, at 154-55. In the United States, the rate may have been as high 
as 3.6%. Id. at 145-46. 
112. Id. at 245-46. At least one contemporary historian casts some doubt on Titmuss's 
analysis: 
In retrospect, Titmuss's critique was unfair. His thesis largely ignored the American 
Red Cross, which accounted for about 40 percent of the blood collected in America.... 
Instead he focused on the booming plasma industry and the rising number of for-profit 
blood banks. What he criticized was not the complex reality of America's blood 
resource, but a caricature .... Titmuss's book hit a public nerve. 
STARR, supra note 110, at 225. 
113. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, supra note 104, at 361. 
114. Id. at 349-50. 
115. Id. at 351-55. This was similar to Robert Solow's critique. Solow took issue with much 
of Titmuss's empirical work and ascribed the United Kingdom's advantage over the United States 
in part to the "the tight little island['s]... tradition of civic-mindedness." Robert M. Solow, Blood 
and Thunder, 80 YALE L.J. 1696, 1705 (1971) (reviewing TITMUSS, supra note 110). Because 
hepatitis had to be self-reported-no hepatitis test existed at the time-Solow found the lower 
quality of blood in the U.S. system to be largely unsurprising: Compared to voluntary blood 
donors, blood sellers (1) are more likely to have hepatitis and (2) face incentives to conceal their 
illness. Id. at 1702-05. 
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proof or refutation would lie in empirical study. 16 Theoretical differences 
aside, the U.S. blood-supply system did in fact transition to an all-volunteer 
system of social donation in the 1970s.17 In surveys since, blood donors 
have reported that they "enjoy helping" others, experience a sense of moral 
obligation or responsibility, or exhibit characteristics of reciprocators after 
they or their relatives received blood. 18 
A number of scholars, primarily in psychology and economics, have 
attempted to resolve this question both empirically and theoretically.119 The 
most systematic work within economics is that of Bruno Frey and various 
collaborators.120 Frey imports a model of motivations from psychologyl21 
and combines it with both analytic modeling and empirical evidence to 
show that the introduction of money, or prices, for an activity may in fact 
lower the level of that activity. He calls this "the crowding-out effect." 
A simple statement of this model is that individuals have intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. Extrinsic motivations are imposed on individuals 
116. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, supra note 104, at 351. 
117. See JANE ALLYN PILIAVIN & PETER L. CALLERO, GIVING BLOOD: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AN ALTRUISTIC IDENTITY 2 (1991) (explaining that the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare announced a policy strongly discouraging blood sales in 1973 and that a subsequent 
regulation requiring differential labeling of blood from voluntary and paid donors also contributed 
to the "virtual elimination of commercial whole-blood banks"); Kieran Healy, Embedded 
Altruism.: Blood Collection Regimes and the European Union 's Donor Population, 105 AM. J. 
Soc. 1633, 1637 (2000); Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, All About Blood: FAQ, 
http://www.aabb.org/All_About_Blood/FAQs/aabb_faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Since 
the 1970s there has been essentially no commercial collection of whole blood in the United States, 
and insurance-based individual responsibility systems are becoming rarer. See STARR, supra note 
110, at 216-27. In 2001, eight million volunteers donated fifteen million units of whole blood and 
red blood cells in the United States. See Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, supra. These donors likely 
represent more than five percent of the age-eligible population, see PILIAVIN & CALLERO, supra, 
at 2, and approximately forty percent of Americans have given blood at some point in their lives, 
see id. at 24. European countries also appear to collect whole blood exclusively from voluntary 
donors, following an official European Union policy announced in 1989. Healy, supra, at 1638. 
Survey research shows that blood donors are common in some European countries, such as 
France, where forty-four percent of age-eligible residents have given blood, and much rarer in 
others, such as Luxembourg, where only fourteen percent of age-eligible residents are donors. 
See id. 
118. See PILIAVIN & CALLERO, supra note 117, at 35-36 (describing motivations of first-time 
donors); id. at 181-90 (describing social norms around donation). 
119. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589 
(2001) (surveying the literature). 
120. See BRUNO S. FREY, INSPIRING ECONOMICS 52-72 (2001) [hereinafter FREY, INSPIRING 
ECONOMICS]; BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY (1997) [hereinafter FREY, NOT JUST FOR 
MONEY]. 
121. He traces the origin of the line of psychology literature he follows to Edward L. Deci, 
Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 105 (1971). FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY, supra note 120, at 13-14. Ironically, then, at 
least one answer to Arrow's critique of the lack of a theoretical causal mechanism for crowding 
out already existed, but in another field. The line of literature is crystallized in EDWARD L. DECI 
& RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR (1985). 
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from the outside, taking the form either of offers of money for, or prices 
imposed on, behavior, or of threats of punishment or promises of reward 
from a manager or a judge for complying with, or failing to comply with, 
specifically prescribed behavior. Intrinsic motivations are reasons for action 
that come from within the person, such as pleasure or personal 
satisfaction.122 Extrinsic motivations are said to "crowd out" intrinsic 
motivations because they (a) impair self-determination-that is, a person 
feels pressured by an external force, and therefore feels overjustified in 
maintaining her intrinsic motivation rather than complying with the will of 
the source of the extrinsic reward; or (b) impair self-esteem-they cause an 
individual to feel that his internal motivation is rejected, not valued, leading 
him to reduce his self-esteem and thus to reduce effort.123 It is not self- 
evident in Frey's own rendition why offering to pay money for an activity 
that an agent is free to forgo impairs self-determination or self-esteem in the 
same way as imposing a penalty or price on the agent's failure to act, which 
the agent cannot avoid, but the intuition is not difficult to explain. It 
depends on a culturally contingent notion of what one "ought" to do if one 
is a well-adjusted human being and member of a decent society. Being 
offered money to do something you know you "ought" to do, and that self- 
respecting members of society do, implies that the offeror believes that you 
are not a well-adjusted human being or an equally respectable member of 
society. An alternative causal explanation is formalized by Roland Benabou 
and Jean Tirole: The person receiving the monetary incentives infers that 
the person offering her the compensation does not trust her to do the right 
thing, or to do it well of her own accord, and her self-confidence and 
intrinsic motivation to succeed are reduced to the extent that she believes 
that the offeror-a manager or parent, for example-is better situated to 
judge her abilities.124 
A substantial empirical literature-including field and laboratory 
experiments, econometrics, and surveys-has tested the hypotheses of this 
model of human motivation and found substantial evidence that, under 
some circumstances, adding money for an activity previously undertaken 
without price compensation reduces, rather than increases, the level of 
activity.125 The work has covered contexts as diverse as employees 
122. See FREY, INSPIRING ECONOMICS, supra note 120, at 55; FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY, 
supra note 120, at 13-14. 
123. See Frey & Jegen, supra note 119, at 594. 
124. ROLAND BANABOU & JEAN TIROLE, SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 2- 
3, 7-10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7585, 2000). 
125. See Frey & Jegen, supra note 119. 
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supplying labor126 or sharing their knowledge with team members,127 
communities accepting locally undesirable land uses (NIMBY behavior 
increases, rather than decreases, with the addition of incentives in place of 
commonweal arguments),128 or adults picking up children from day care 
centers (parents come later, rather than earlier, when a price is imposed on 
coming late).129 The results of this work strongly suggest that some 
displacement, or crowding out, can be identified across various domains 
between monetary rewards and nonmonetary motivations. This does not 
mean that offering monetary incentives does not increase extrinsic rewards. 
It does, and where extrinsic rewards dominate, this will increase the 
rewarded activity as usually predicted in economics. But the effect on 
intrinsic motivation at least sometimes operates in the opposite direction. 
Where intrinsic motivation is an important factor, because pricing and 
contracting are difficult to achieve or because the payment is relatively low, 
the aggregate effect may be negative. Inducing transfers of tacit knowledge 
from employees to the teams they work with is a good example of the 
former type of condition,130 while low payments for otherwise volunteer- 
based activities are an example of the latter.131 
Frey's psychologically based extrinsic-/intrinsic-motivation distinction 
is helpful, and the empirical evidence is powerful. The psychological 
construct does not, however, seem fully to account for motivation in social 
sharing frameworks. As Frey himself implies, recognition by friends is 
plainly a form of extrinsic motivation,132 while the attainment of wealth is 
not purely functional and extrinsic but, as Veblen explained long ago, plays 
a role in providing social recognition,133 which in turn is likely quite central 
to people's sense of intrinsic satisfaction. In the social capital literature, 
social interactions are very often understood in functional rather than 
symbolic and psychological terms-their value lies in providing future 
126. See Truman F. Bewley, A Depressed Labor Market as Explained by Participants, 85 
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 250, 252 (1995) (providing survey data about managers' 
beliefs about the effects of incentive contracts). 
127. See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Organizational Forms, 11 ORG. SCI. 538, 546-47 (2000). 
128. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997); Howard Kunreuther & 
Douglas Easterling, Are Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities?, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 252, 252-86 (1990). 
129. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) 
(finding that introducing a fine for tardy pickup increased, rather than decreased, tardiness by 
parents). 
130. See Osterloh & Frey, supra note 127. 
131. See Frey & Jegen, supra note 119, at 601-02. 
132. See FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY, supra note 120, at 14. 
133. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 52-75 (Modem Library 
2001) (1899) (explaining conspicuous consumption). 
326 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
access to information, resources, and opportunities for action.134 This 
social-functional thesis of why people might behave sociably and share 
does not require a psychological explanation, but might still have a similar 
relationship with money, where paid cooperative behavior demands less 
nonmonetary reciprocation than uncompensated cooperation. Such an 
interpretation would equally well explain empirical findings that payments 
crowd out reciprocating cooperation.135 The social capital literature, in any 
event, seems to assume that what can be attained through social position 
and relations is not substitutable, at least not perfectly, with what can be 
bought. That is what makes social relations a form of capital distinct from 
financial capital. 
For purposes of my analysis here it is not necessary to pin down 
precisely the correct and most complete theory of motivation or the full 
extent and dimensions of crowding out. All that is required to outline the 
framework for analysis is the recognition that there is some form of social- 
psychological motivation that is neither fungible with money nor simply 
cumulative with it.136 Transacting within the price system may either 
increase or decrease the social-psychological rewards-be they intrinsic or 
extrinsic, functional or symbolic.137 
134. See, e.g., LIN, supra note 85, at 149-50, 149-51 (claiming that "[t]here are two ultimate 
(or primitive) rewards for human beings in a social structure: economic standing and social 
standing," and elaborating a thesis where in both cases these represent relational standing, in 
terms of capacity to mobilize resources, some that can be mobilized by money, others that can be 
mobilized by social relations). James Coleman similarly focuses on the functional characteristics 
of social networks, see Coleman, supra note 85, as do other major versions of the social capital 
literature, see MARK GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTRACTS AND CAREERS 
(2d ed. 1995); Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the 
Organization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 (1980); Mark S. Granovetter, The 
Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360 (1973). 
135. In particular, studies that focus on the crowding out of reciprocity support a social causal 
theory. See, e.g., ERNST FEHR & SIMON GACHTER, Do INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDERMINE 
VOLUNTARY COOPERATION? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working 
Paper No. 34, 2002) (describing laboratory experimental results for the effects of incentives on 
cooperation). 
136. One sees this assumption in operation in the nonprofit literature. See WEISBROD, supra 
note 4, at 31-33 (describing the motivational profile of nonprofit entrepreneurs and providing 
empirical evidence that the nonprofit sector draws individuals with different motivational profiles 
than the for-profit sector); Dennis R. Young, Entrepreneurship and the Behavior of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Elements of a Theory, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 4, at 161 (describing the nonprofit sector precisely in terms of motivational profiles of 
nonprofit entrepreneurs). 
137. Crowding out may not, however, be an important effect in the relationship of 
government provisioning to volunteer donation. Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown that the 
relationship is ambiguous and that government provisioning may not crowd out private donation, 
but merely change its focus and shape. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Do Government Grants to 
Charity Reduce Private Donations?, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 4, at 313; see also Burton A. Abrams & Mark D. Schmitz, The Crowding Out Effect of 
Governmental Transfers on Private Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
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The intuition is simple. Leaving a fifty-dollar bill on the table after one 
has finished a pleasant dinner at a friend's house would not increase the 
host's social and psychological gains from the evening. Most likely it 
would so diminish them that one would never again be invited. A bottle of 
wine or bouquet would, to the contrary, improve the social gains. And if 
dinner is not intuitively obvious, think of sex. The point is simple. Money- 
oriented motivations are different from socially oriented motivations. 
Sometimes they align. Sometimes they collide. Which of the two will be the 
case is historically and culturally contingent. The presence of money in 
sports or entertainment reduced the social-psychological gains from 
performance in Victorian England, at least for members of the middle and 
upper classes. This is reflected in the longstanding insistence on the 
amateur status of the Olympics, or the dubious status of actors in that 
society. This has changed dramatically over a century later, when athletes' 
and popular entertainers' social standing is practically measured by the 
millions of dollars their performances can command. 
The relative relationships of money and social-psychological rewards 
depend on culture and context. Similar actions may have different meanings 
in different social or cultural contexts. While I have elsewhere offered more 
detailed descriptions,138 one example illustrates how these components 
interact. Consider three lawyers contemplating whether to write a paper 
presenting their opinions. One is a practicing attorney. The second is a 
judge. The third is an academic. For the first, money and honor are often, 
though not always, positively correlated. Being able to command a very 
high hourly fee for writing the requested paper is one mode of expressing 
one's standing in the profession. And yet, there are modes of acquiring 
esteem-like writing the paper as a report for a bar committee-that not 
only are not improved by the presence of money, but are in fact undermined 
by it. This latter effect is sharpest for the judge. If a judge is approached 
with an offer of money for writing an opinion, not only is this not a mark of 
honor, it is a subversion of the social role and would render corrupt the 
writing of the opinion. The intrinsic rewards for the judge from writing the 
opinion when matched by a payment for the product would be guilt and 
shame, and the offer therefore an expression of disrespect. Finally, if the 
same paper is requested of the academic, the effect of the money falls 
somewhere in between the judge and the practitioner. To a high degree, like 
the judge, the academic who writes for money is rendered suspect in her 
community of scholarship. A paper clearly funded by a party, the results of 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 304, 311 (finding somewhat ambiguously a partial displacement of 
private contributions by public funding). 
138. See Benkler, supra note 3. 
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which support the party's regulatory or litigation position, is practically 
worthless as an academic work. But in a mirror image of the practitioner, 
there are some forms of money that add to an academic's social- 
psychological rewards, peer-reviewed grants and prizes most prominent 
among them. Pursuing them reinforces rather than undermines the 
academic's social-psychological rewards. 
A comparison of market and social systems for organizing production 
by utilizing shareable goods in terms of motivation, then, will reveal money 
(or any other expression of market exchange value) and social- 
psychological rewards as alternative sources of motivation. The pursuit of 
one sometimes complements, but sometimes undermines, the value of the 
action as measured in terms of the other. The relationship of the two is 
culturally and historically contingent. Capturing the potential for human 
action that could be motivated by the exchange of love, status, and 
esteem,139 a personal sense of worth in relations with others, is the strong 
suit of social production (and sometimes, depending on time and context, 
the state-as in "Uncle Sam Wants You!"). Social production rewards 
action either solely in these forms or, if it adds money, organizes its flow in 
such a way that it at least does not conflict with and undermine the quantum 
of self-confidence, love, esteem, or social networking value obtained by the 
agent from acting. 
C. Motivation and Information 
To compare the attractiveness of market and social exchange systems, 
then, we should compare (1) the transaction costs of using one or the other 
system of exchange and (2) the likely reward flows to individuals from 
participating in one or the other of the two systems. The two considerations 
are independent of each other. If one is concerned with welfare 
optimization, then what needs to be optimized is the combined effect of 
both. Comparing them is a context-specific, empirical exercise that depends 
on the characteristics of the good, the use, and the extant social and market 
practices and institutions in the society for which the two are compared. 
The answers may be different for apples than for oranges,140 for economists 
than for Melanesian islanders.141 These questions provide rich grounds for 
139. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997). 
140. The latter have lower transaction costs for sharing because of their morphology. 
141. Melanesian islanders have appeared as all but the personification of gift economies ever 
since Bronislaw Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific. MALINOWSKI, supra note 6. 
Economists, by contrast, have been the subject of claims that they systematically behave less pro- 
socially than students of other disciplines. See John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists 
Different, and if So, Why?, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 171; Bjdrn Frank & Giinther G. 
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empirical observations about sharing and secondary-market practices, but 
they do not give us an approximate general intuition about the modality that 
exchange of excess capacity generated by shareable goods will take, except 
in one instance of central importance: when excess capacity is widely 
distributed in small quanta. 
When the state of technology results in excess capacity being widely 
distributed in small dollops, social sharing will outperform secondary 
markets. This is so because of both transaction costs and motivation. The 
difference between the transaction costs of a secondary market and those of 
a sharing system increases linearly with the number of transactions 
necessary to collect a usable amount of functionality. The smaller the 
amount of excess capacity held by each unit owner relative to the total 
amount required for the functionality, the higher the number of transactions 
necessary to achieve the functionality, and the larger the gap in transaction 
costs between market-based clearance and social sharing. Furthermore, the 
smaller the amount of excess capacity each unit owner owns relative to the 
total required, the smaller the payment that each owner can get. It is 
precisely where payments are low that their introduction is likely to have 
only a minor positive effect on contributions, and therefore to leave the 
crowding-out effect to dominate the overall level of participation. Fewer 
owners will be willing to sell their excess capacity cheaply than to give it 
away for free, and the transaction costs of selling will be higher than those 
of sharing. 
Recognizing that social sharing can under some circumstances be more 
efficient than market-based models of production has substantial policy 
implications. At a broad policy level, we could focus on one of two goals. 
The first goal is relevant when we can say with some degree of confidence 
that a particular problem is particularly amenable to solution within one or 
another of the systems of production. It focuses on providing stronger 
institutional guides toward funneling the behavior into that system-either 
a market or a social production system, respectively. The second, more 
widely applicable goal, until we have learned more about the contours of 
social production and exchange, is to study changes in law and policy so as 
Schulze, Does Economics Make Citizens Corrupt?, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 101 (2000); 
Robert H. Frank et al., Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 187; 
Bruno S. Frey et al., Economics Indoctrination or Selection? Some Empirical Results, 24 J. ECON. 
EDUC. 271 (1993); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? 
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295 (1981); Anthony M. 
Yezer et al., Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What 
We Say or How We Play, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 177. This observation may, however, 
reflect a selection bias-that is, it is more likely that selfish people self-select into the discipline 
than that exposure to the discipline causes selfishness. See FREY & MEIER, supra note 2, at 14-16, 
31 tbl.6. 
330 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 
to avoid tipping the production system toward one or another of these 
competing systems-in particular, in favor of the one with which we are 
more familiar, the market-before we have good reason to think that the 
preferred system is the better one. 
The basic point is that for any given resource that exists in an 
institutional-cultural space at a moment in history, there will be different 
costs to move from no transactions to either a secondary market system or a 
social exchange system. These costs partly depend on the technological 
characteristics of the good. Some things may have very small quanta of 
excess capacity, so that aggregation into a usable amount of capacity would 
generate many transactions with many individuals. The high transaction 
costs of markets could rule out efficiency-seeking policy through secondary 
markets. Partly, however, the costs depend on social practices and cultural 
values of the people in the relevant society. For example, if market 
institutions are prevalent and people are culturally attuned to making every 
penny they can, then moving to a secondary market will (1) incur lower 
fixed transaction costs for institution building and repurposing, (2) require 
fewer attitudinal and social practice adjustments, and (3) hit the right 
motivational pitch to which people in this society are attuned. And vice 
versa-in a society where sharing or other nonmarket cooperation among 
non-kin is widespread and where social institutions and attitudes are more 
readily available to support a sharing system for impersonal interactions, 
the transition costs from perfect exclusion to social sharing will be lower 
than the transition costs from the same perfect exclusion to secondary 
markets. 
When we are faced with policy proposals for institutional changes that 
affect practices involved in production and exchange, we should consider 
their effects not only on market production, but also on social production. 
To the extent that policy is properly concerned with increasing production 
of a given desideratum, it should be driven by an analysis of how the policy 
change will affect total production in both systems (or all three, including 
state-based production), not only on how it will affect one of them. 
IV. SHARING AS A MODALITY OF PRODUCTION 
Up to this point this Essay has been focused on sharing of material 
goods that appear to be "traditional" economic goods-rival and private- 
but that are nonetheless amenable to sharing. We can now integrate these 
observations with work done in a number of related areas of study, as well 
as with my own earlier work on online peer production, to consider sharing 
at a broader level of abstraction as an alternative modality of economic 
production. In this Part, I will attempt to outline what "sharing" as a 
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modality of economic production might mean and how we could think of 
locating its role in the economy. The last Part will be devoted to outlining 
how recognizing sharing as an important form of production can affect 
some contemporary policy debates. 
The claim is that sharing is a pervasive modality of economic 
production. By "economic production," I mean the provisioning of goods 
and services that people value. By "pervasive," I mean that it is an approach 
to organizing economic production integral to many daily contexts- 
whether we think of it or not. 
Under certain technological circumstances, practically feasible 
opportunities for action are distributed in such a pattern that they are 
amenable to execution by a class of approaches to organizing production 
that rely on sharing. These are typified by (1) radical decentralization of the 
capacity to contribute to effective action and the authority to decide on the 
contribution and (2) reliance on social information flows, organizational 
approaches, and motivation structures, rather than on prices or commands, 
to motivate and direct productive contributions. 
Most practices of production-social or market based-are already 
embedded in a given technological context. They present no visible 
"problem" to solve or policy choice to make. We do not need to focus 
consciously on improving the conditions under which friends lend each 
other a hand to move boxes, make dinner, or take kids to school, and we 
feel no need to reconsider the appropriateness of the production of 
automobiles by market-based firms. However, in moments when a field of 
action is undergoing a technological transition that changes the 
opportunities for sharing as a modality of production, understanding that 
sharing is a modality of production becomes more important, as does 
understanding how it functions as such. This is so, as we are seeing today, 
when prior technologies have already set up market- or state-based 
production systems that have law and policymaking systems already 
designed to fit their requirements. While the old arrangements may have 
once been the most efficient, or may even have been absolutely necessary 
for the incumbent production systems, their extension under new 
technological conditions may undermine, rather than improve, the capacity 
of a society to produce and provision the goods, resources, or 
functionalities that are the object of policy analysis. Today this is true of 
wireless communications regulation, or "spectrum management," as it is 
usually called; it is true of the regulation of information, knowledge, and 
cultural production, or "intellectual property," as it is usually now called; 
and it may be true of policies for computation and wired communications 
networks, as distributed computing and the emerging peer-to-peer 
architectures are suggesting. I will consider these policy areas in Part V. 
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A. Sharing Is a Common and Underappreciated Modality of Production 
There is a curious congruence between the anthropologists of the gift 
and mainstream economists today. Both treat the gift literature as being 
about the periphery, about societies starkly different from modem capitalist 
ones. As Godelier puts it, 
What a contrast between these types of society, these social and 
mental universes, and today's capitalist society where the majority 
of social relations are impersonal (involving the individual as 
citizen and the state, for instance), and where the exchange of 
things and services is conducted for the most part in an anonymous 
marketplace, leaving little room for an economy and a moral code 
based on gift-giving. 42 
And yet, sharing is everywhere around us in the advanced economies. The 
past two decades or so have seen an increasing focus in a number of 
literatures on production processes that rely heavily on social relations, 
rather than on price-based signals or governmental policies. These include, 
initially, the literature on social norms'43 and social capital, or trust.144 Both 
literatures, however, are statements of the institutional role that social 
mechanisms play in enabling market exchange and production.145 More 
142. GODELIER, supra note 6, at 106-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143. In the legal literature, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How 
NEIGHBORS ETTLE DISPUTES (1991) is the locus classicus for showing how social norms can 
substitute for law. For a bibliography of the social norms literature outside of law, see McAdams, 
supra note 139, at 339 nn.1-2. Early contributions were EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, HE 
EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977); James S. Coleman, Norms as Social Capital, in ECONOMIC 
IMPERIALISM 133 (Peter Bernholz & Gerard Radnitzky eds., 1987); and Sally Engle Merry, 
Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL: 
FUNDAMENTALS 271 (Donald Black ed., 1984). 
144. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis trace to Kenneth Arrow the argument that social trust 
compensates for market failures in enabling cooperation. "In the absence of trust ... opportunities 
for mutually beneficial co-operation would have to be foregone." Kenneth J. Arrow, Political and 
Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 22 (Michael D. Intriligator ed., 1971). "[N]orms of social behavior, including 
ethical and moral codes .... [may be] reactions of society to compensate for market failures." Id. 
145. The ranchers of Shasta County in Ellickson's classic study were producing norms 
socially. They were not producing beef in response to social motivations or signals, in the way 
that, for example, the participants in SETI@home produce computation socially, or the 
programmers who coauthor free software projects do. They were provisioning governance 
through social mechanisms. The governance issues they tackled were the conflicts that arose from 
their market-based behavior. The problem that has been the focus of economic claims about social 
capital is that trust relations provide an important social context for markets, in lowering 
transaction costs and improving production in market systems. But they are in the first instance 
understood as means of smoothing the operations of a market production and exchange system. 
These are to be distinguished from the political claims about the relationship between social 
capital and democracy, which were central to Robert Putnam's treatment. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
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direct observations of social production and exchange systems are provided 
by the literature on social provisioning of public goods-like the literature 
on social norm enforcement as a dimension of policing criminality146 and 
that on common property regimes.147 The former is limited by its focus on 
the provisioning of public goods. The latter is usually limited by its focus 
on discretely identifiable types of resources-common pool resources-that 
must be managed as among a group of claimants while retaining a 
proprietary outer boundary toward nonmembers.148 The broadest set of 
claims similar to those I make here comes from Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis, who describe "community governance" as a complementary system 
for solving problems, some of which take the form of production problems, 
some the form of public-goods provisioning.149 Their claim is that 
communities can have advantages: The prevalence of repeat interactions 
improves incentives to cooperate, the ability to acquire information about 
past and present and to predict likely future behavior of other participants 
reduces risk of defection or failure, and the organizational spaces provide a 
platform for practicing the empirically tested fact that many people have a 
taste for enforcing against antisocial behavior. Along these dimensions, 
they claim that community governance systems exist alongside, and 
complement, markets and states where their relative advantages make them 
better than markets and states at solving governance problems. 50 
My own aim is to generalize this claim, such that we understand 
"community governance" aimed at production as a special case of social 
sharing, one that gains robustness because it involves tightly connected 
social groups. But social sharing is a broader phenomenon, one that 
includes cooperative enterprises that can be pursued by weakly connected 
participants or even by total strangers and yet function as a sustainable and 
substantial modality of economic production. Indeed, in the context of the 
digitally networked environment, it is this type of sharing and cooperative 
146. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1194-201 (1996); Dan 
M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
2477 (1997). 
147. See supra note 77; see also Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the 
New Law and Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479 (2000); Carol M. Rose, The Several 
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 129 (1998). 
148. See OSTROM, supra note 77, at 91-92 (listing clearly defined boundaries as crucial to 
success). Plainly, however, the provisioning of a dam in Ostrom's description of the Philippine 
zanjeiras, id. at 82-88, organized around claims to the resulting water flow, none of which is price 
based or legal fiat based, describes a richly detailed social production system. 
149. See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 91. 
150. See id. 
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production among strangers and weakly connected participants that holds 
the greatest economic promise. 
The most visible set of practices that typify this broader claim is what I 
have called commons-based peer production-large-scale cooperative 
efforts in which the thing shared among the participants is their creative 
effort.15' Most prominent among these is free software. A sharing-based 
approach to software development, free software or open source software 
depends on many individuals contributing to a common project out of a 
variety of motivations and then sharing their respective contributions 
without any one entity or person asserting a right of exclusion to either the 
contributed components or the resulting whole. In order to avoid the joint 
product being appropriated by any single party, participants usually retain 
copyrights in their contributions but license them to anyone-participant or 
stranger-on a model that joins a universal license to use the materials with 
constraints that make its reappropriation by either the contributor or a third 
party difficult, if not impossible. While there have been many arguments 
about how widely the provisions that prevent appropriation should be used, 
the practical adoption patterns have been dominated by forms of licensing 
that prevent reappropriation of the contributions or the joint product.152 
Free software has played an important role in the recognition of peer 
production because software is a functional good with measurable qualities. 
It can be more or less authoritatively tested, quantitatively, against its 
market-based competitors. And in many instances free software has 
prevailed. Over sixty percent of web server software, in particular for 
critical e-commerce sites, runs on the Apache web server-free software.'53 
More than half of all back-office e-mail functions are run by one free 
software program or another.154 These are mission-critical applications for 
151. See Benkler, supra note 3; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 44-49. 
152. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
(forthcoming Spring 2005) (manuscript at 37 tbl. 1) (identifying roughly eighty-five percent of the 
licenses in active projects on SourceForge, the biggest site for clearance of free software 
development projects, as having "restrictive" or "very restrictive" licenses-that is, largely 
speaking, as being copylefted). 
153. Netcraft, Web Server Survey Archives, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_server 
survey.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
154. E-mail server surveys are less common and regularized than web server surveys. For 
much of the 1990s, the dominant e-mail server was Sendmail, see GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE 
243 (2001), which was distributed mostly under a Berkeley Software Design (BSD) license and is 
currently available under that license to all but those who intend to be commercial redistributors 
of the software when unaccompanied by its source code, see Sendmail License, 
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/license (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). In the past few years, 
Sendmail has lost market share, partly to other free software projects and partly to a new 
proprietary e-mail server, iMail, which seems to have risen in usage to around 19% of market 
share. Compare Credentia, E-Mail Server Survey Results for April 2003, 
http://www.credentia.cc/surveys/smtp/200304/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (noting iMail's 8.4% 
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the organizations that adopt them, applications that most organizations 
would not jeopardize to save a few thousand dollars in licensing fees. 
Google, Amazon, and CNN.com, for example, are not running their web 
servers on the GNU/Linux operating system'55 in order to save licensing 
fees at the risk of a higher failure rate for their core businesses. The 
measurable efficacy of free software has made dismissing the phenomenon 
harder. The centrality of software to production in the information and 
communications environment has made its success impossible to ignore and 
important to preserve and emulate. 
While free software is the most visible instance of peer production, 
with areas of measurably superior performance, it is not its only locus. I 
have described these other phenomena in detail elsewhere,156 but will 
encapsulate one example here. Slashdot is a technology-news site 
coauthored by a quarter of a million users.'•7 It is far from perfect, but it has 
become something of a must-read for anyone seriously interested in 
information and communications technology. The site allows its hundreds 
of thousands of users to scour the Internet for news, to identify what is 
relevant and what is not, and to post links with commentary for others to 
read. Users then comment and elaborate, work that itself is peer reviewed 
by other users through a system of technologically mediated recording of 
quality judgments. The peer reviewers are themselves reviewed by other 
users periodically, and may be removed if enough other users find their 
judgments lacking. The whole system of posting of stories, commentary on 
stories posted, and recursive peer review of the commentary and of the 
quality of the peer reviewers runs on a free software platform. Together 
market share in April 2003), with FalkoTimme, Mail Server Survey March 2004, 
http://www.falkotimme.com/projects/survey_smtp 032004.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) 
(noting iMail's 18.75% share in March 2004). At the same time, however, a free software project 
supported by IBM, Postfix, also rose from 2.53% to 20.55%. Compare Credentia, supra, with 
FalkoTimme, supra. Postfix is a particularly interesting case because it was developed as an 
alternative to Sendmail but also self-consciously as a competitor to Qmail. See Postfix Overview, 
http://www.postfix.org/motivation.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Qmail, in turn, was 
developed as an alternative to Sendmail, and for a while was believed to have been developed by 
Daniel Bemrnstein for release as free software. Bernstein, however, has chosen to release the 
software at no charge, but under terms that give him strong authorial control. See D.J. Bernstein, 
Information for Distributors, http://cr.yp.to/qmail/dist.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Qmail's 
use declined dramatically between the two surveys cited above, suggesting a preference in the 
community of adopters for free software over software that is offered at no charge, but 
nonetheless controlled. 
155. Information about the operating system used by a website can be obtained by querying 
the site. A simple tool is available at Netcraft, About the Netcraft Web Server Query Form, 
http://uptime.netcraft.com/up/graph (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). The three sites are selected 
purely for anecdotal intuitive reasons, with no special claim to being representative of broader 
usage statistics. 
156. See Benkler, supra note 3, at 381-400. 
157. Slashdot, http://slashdot.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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these provide an identifiable information good, co-produced by many users, 
in a manner that is efficacious and yet based on social motivations and 
structures of participation, not on prices or hierarchical commands. The 
users contribute and share in each other's time and judgments about what is 
relevant to this community of interest and how to evaluate the events of the 
day in its fields of coverage. In this case, the "shareable good" involved is 
the time, education, and effort of the users who participate. It is combined 
with a public good-existing information-to form what is also itself a 
public good-a topical news and commentary source. Other similar 
endeavors have provisioned an encyclopedia coauthored by a few thousand 
volunteers,158 a comprehensive human-edited directory of websites, on the 
model of the Yahoo! directory but provisioned by over 60,000 
volunteers,'59 and many other examples.160 
Creative labor in the context of peer production can be harnessed when 
a project is broken up into discrete modules, whose granularity is varied 
and sufficiently fine grained to allow individuals with diverse motivations 
to engage in the effort at levels appropriate for their motivations but still 
provide stable contributions to the whole.161 In this, the modularity and 
granularity of the individual effort and time required by a project allow 
individuals to segment their own days, weeks, or months such that they can 
find "excess capacity" that they can contribute to the common effort. The 
relative efficiency of peer production and markets, as with the case of social 
sharing of shareable goods, is analyzed in terms similar to those offered 
here--concerning information, transaction costs, and motivations-but with 
changes appropriate for the case of human creative labor, which is different 
in many ways from the material goods that were the subject of the first 
three Parts of this Essay. 
These lines of literature point to an emerging understanding of social 
production and exchange. This phenomenon is not limited to public goods, 
to exotic out-of-the-way places like surviving medieval Spanish irrigation 
regions'62 or the shores of Maine's lobster-fishing grounds,'63 or even to the 
ubiquitous phenomenon of the household.164 Nor, as SETI@home and the 
body snatchers and slugs of Northern Virginia suggest, is it necessarily 
limited to stable communities of individuals who interact often and know 
158. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
159. Open Directory Project, http://www.dmoz.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
160. See Benkler, supra note 3. 
161. See id. at 400-43. 
162. See OSTROM, supra note 77, at 69-81. 
163. See ACHESON, supra note 77. 
164. See AT THE INTERFACE: THE HOUSEHOLD AND BEYOND (David B. Small & Nicola 
Tannenbaum eds., 1999); THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY: RECONSIDERING THE DOMESTIC MODE 
OF PRODUCTION (Richard R. Wilk ed., 1989); Ellickson, supra note 83. 
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each other or expect to continue to interact personally. Social production of 
goods and services, both public and private, is pervasive, though unnoticed. 
It sometimes substitutes for, and sometimes complements, market and state 
production everywhere. It is, to be fanciful, the dark matter of our economic 
production universe. 
Consider the way in which the following sentences are intuitively 
familiar, yet as a practical matter describe the provisioning of goods or 
services that have well-defined NAICS categories.165 Their provisioning 
through the markets is accounted for in the economic census, but they are 
commonly provisioned in a form consistent with the definition of sharing- 
on a radically distributed model, without price or command. 
NAICS 624410 [Babysitting services, child day care] 
"John, could you pick up Bobby today when you take Lauren to 
soccer? I have a conference call I have to make." 
"Are you doing homework with Zoe today, or shall I?" 
NAICS 484210 [Trucking used household, office, or institutional 
furniture and equiptment] 
"Jane, could you lend a hand moving this table to the dining room?" 
"Here, let me hold the elevator door for you, that looks heavy." 
NAICS 484122 [Trucking, general freight trucking, long distance, less 
than truckload] 
"Jack, do you mind if I load my box of books in your trunk so you can 
drop it off at my brother's on your way to Boston?" 
NAICS 519110 [Traffic reporting services] 
"Oh, don't take 1-95, it's got horrible construction traffic to exit 39." 
NAICS 711510 [Newspaper columnists, independent (freelance)] 
"I don't know about Clark, he doesn't move me, I think he should be 
more aggressive in criticizing Bush on Iraq." 
NAICS 621610 [Home health care services] 
"Can you please get me my medicine? I'm too wiped to get up." 
"Would you like a cup of tea?" 
165. NAICS stands for North American Industry Classification System, developed by the U.S. 
Census Bureau to describe economic activity. See NAICS Home Page, http://www.census.gov/ 
epcd/www/naics.html ( ast visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
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NAICS 561591 [Tourist information bureaus] 
"Excuse me, how do I get to Carnegie Hall?" 
NAICS 561320 [Temporary help services] 
"I've got a real crunch on the farm, can you come over on Saturday and 
lend a hand?" 
"This is crazy, I've got to get this document out tonight. Could you lend 
me a hand with proofing and pulling it all together?" 
NAICS 71 [Arts, entertainment, and recreation] 
"Did you hear the one about the Buddhist monk, the rabbi, and the 
Catholic priest?" 
"Roger, bring out your guitar!" 
"Anybody up for a game of... ?" 
The litany of examples reveals a conception of social sharing that 
differs from the current foci of the literature along four different 
dimensions. First, the examples relate to production of goods and services, 
not only of norms or rules. Social relations provide the very motivations 
for, and information relating to, production and exchange, not only the 
institutional framework for organizing action that itself is motivated, 
informed, and organized by markets or managerial commands. Second, they 
relate to all kinds of goods, not only public goods. In particular, the 
paradigm cases of free software development, distributed computing, and 
carpooling involve labor and shareable goods--each plainly using private 
goods as inputs and, in the case of carpooling and distributed computing, 
producing private goods as outputs. Third, at least some of them relate not 
only to relations of production within well-defined communities of 
individuals who have repeated interactions, but extend to cover baseline 
standards of human decency. These standards enable passersby to ask one 
another for the time or for directions, enable drivers to cede the road to each 
other, and enable strangers to collaborate on software projects, on 
coauthoring an online encyclopedia, or on running simulations of how 
proteins fold. Fourth, they may either complement or substitute for market 
and state production systems, depending on the social construction of 
mixed provisioning. 
What weight social and sharing-based production has in the economy is 
hard to measure. Our intuitions about capillary systems would suggest that 
the total volume of boxes or books moved or lifted; instructions given; 
news relayed; and meals prepared by family, friends, neighbors, and 
minimally decent strangers would be high relative to the amount of 
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substitutable activity carried on through market exchanges or state 
provisioning. 
B. Sharing Is Sensitive to Technology Because Individual Efficacy Is 
Subject to Physical-Capital Constraints 
A threshold requirement for social sharing to be a modality of 
economic production, as opposed to purely one of social reproduction, is 
that sharing-based action be effective. Efficacy of individual action depends 
on the physical-capital requirements for action to become materially 
effective, which in turn depend on technology. When effective action has 
very low physical-capital requirements, so that every individual possesses, 
by natural capacity, the physical capital necessary for action, social 
production or sharing can be (though may in practice not become) 
ubiquitous. Voice cords to participate in a sing-along and muscles to lift a 
box are obvious examples. When the capital requirements are nontrivial, 
but the capital good is still widely distributed and available, sharing can 
similarly be ubiquitous and effective. This is true whether the shared 
resource or good is the capacity of the capital good itself-as in the case of 
shareable goods-or some widely distributed human capacity capable of 
being made effective through the use of the widely distributed capital 
goods-as in the case of the human creativity, judgment, experience, and 
labor that are shared in online peer production processes, for which 
participants rely on the widespread availability of connected computers to 
participate. 
When some larger-scale physical-capital requirement is a threshold 
requirement of effective action, however, we should not expect to see 
widespread reliance on decentralized sharing as a standard modality of 
production. Industrial mass manufacture of automobiles, steel, and plastic 
toys is not the sort of thing likely to be produced on a social sharing basis, 
because of the capital constraints. This is not to say that even for large-scale 
capital projects, like irrigation systems and dams, social production systems 
cannot step into the breach. We have those core examples in the common 
property regime literature, and we have worker-owned firms as examples of 
mixed systems. But those systems tend to replicate the characteristics of 
firm, state, or market production-using various combinations of quotas, 
scrip systems, formal policing by "professional" officers, quasi-formal 
systems for adjudicating disputes, and midlevel management within 
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worker-owned firms.'66 By comparison, the lobster gangs of Maine167 or 
fishing groups in Japan,'68 whose capital requirements are much lower, tend 
to be more social-relations-based systems, with less formalized or crisp 
measurement of contributions to and calls on the production system. 
It is important to emphasize that technology imposes threshold 
constraints on effective sharing, but it cannot unilaterally determine the 
level of sharing practiced in a society. At any given level of technically 
feasible sharing, societies may differ in their cultural practices and tastes. 
These differences can be expressed in the approach I offered in Part III as 
(1) the level of background investment in any one of the alternative 
transactional frameworks and (2) the shape of the demand for social- 
psychological rewards. Differences in these elements will result in different 
levels of sharing in societies that share a technological state but differ in 
their cultures of sharing. A change in technology, however, that increases 
the supply of opportunities for sharing should, other things being equal, 
increase the prevalence of sharing practices. Moreover, if culture is 
endogenous, then the taste for sharing will also change with the increase in 
feasible opportunities for sharing. For example, one possible interpretation 
of the survey data about preferences of carpoolersl69 is that it is an 
indication of coherence-seeking attitudinal changes toward the benefits of 
sociability, time saving, etc. that carpoolers adopt to make their practice 
cohere with their beliefs, rather than of attitudinal priors that individuals 
hold before participating in the practice.'17 If this were so, and we believed 
that by practicing sharing people come to value it more, or come to learn to 
trust other participants, then an increase in opportunities to share will 
dynamically increase the taste for sharing as well,"'7 which will increase the 
166. See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 104 (describing the worker-owned firm as simply a 
species of firm ownership); OSTROM, supra note 77, at 69-82 (describing the governance 
mechanisms of the complex irrigation systems). 
167. See ACHESON, supra note 77. 
168. See Jean-Philippe Platteau & Erika Seki, Community Arrangements To Overcome 
Market Failures. Pooling Groups in Japanese Fisheries, in COMMUNITIES AND MARKETS IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 344 (Masahiko Aoki & Yujiro Hayami eds., 2001). 
169. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
170. See Simon, supra note 54. 
171. I have been criticized on this point with the claim that if sharing becomes more 
widespread, perhaps it will be "cheapened": The ubiquity of sharing and giving will drain these 
acts of the status they derive from being exceptional, thus effectively crowding itself out. This is 
of course an empirical prediction, not an analytic objection, but one that comports neither with 
intuition nor with evidence. As for intuition, imagine that taking a friend home in your car after a 
party is an uncommon practice, so that when you take someone and drop them off three blocks 
from home you get great kudos. Now imagine that the practice grows, and people often take each 
other home. When a friend says, "I have no car," what happens? (1) You think to yourself, "Ah, 
everyone is taking people home in their cars now, so I won't get kudos," and then say, "Sorry, I 
can't," and the friend thinks and says, "Oh, that's fine"; or, (2) you think and say the same as in 
(1), but the friend thinks to herself, "What a selfish sociopath," the expectation of which actually 
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amount of sharing practiced. This is a virtuous cycle, at least from the 
perspective of anyone who holds that a society that practices trust and 
sharing is normatively more attractive than a society where agents treat 
each other at arm's length.172 
To say that sharing is technology dependent is not to deny that it is a 
ubiquitous human phenomenon. Sharing is so deeply ingrained in so many 
of our cultures that it would be difficult to argue that with the "right" (or 
perhaps "wrong") technological contingencies, it would simply disappear. 
My claim is much narrower. It is that the relative economic role of sharing 
changes with technology. There are technological conditions that require 
more or less capital, in larger or smaller packets, for effective provisioning 
of goods, services, and resources valued functionally. As these conditions 
change, the relative scope for social sharing practices to play a role in 
production changes too. When goods, services, and resources are widely 
dispersed, their owners can choose to engage with each other through social 
sharing instead of through markets or a formal state-based relationship, 
because individuals have available to them the resources necessary to 
engage in such behavior without recourse to capital markets or the taxation 
power of the state. If technological changes make the resources necessary 
for effective action rare or expensive, individuals may wish to interact in 
social relations but will only be able to do so ineffectively, or in different 
fields of endeavor that do not similarly require high capitalization. Large- 
grained, expensive physical capital draws behavior into one or the other of 
the modalities of production that can concentrate financial capital. Nothing, 
however, prevents change from happening in the opposite direction. Goods, 
services, and resources that in the industrial stage of the information 
economy required large-scale, concentrated capital investment to provision 
are now subject to a changing technological environment that can make 
sharing a better way of achieving the same results today than can states, 
markets, or their hybrid, regulated industries. 
Music, for instance, was a relational good in the nineteenth century.173 
It was something people did in the physical presence of one another: in the 
folk way of hearing, repeating, and improvising; in the middle-class way of 
buying sheet music and playing for guests or attending public 
results in (3) your saying in the first place, "Sure, I'd love to," and if you want to earn the kudos, 
you go three blocks out of your way and drop her off at the front door. Beyond the intuition, both 
analytic models and empirical evidence support the proposition that as kind, sharing, and 
reciprocal behavior increases in society, so does the tendency to trust others, reciprocate, and 
behave pro-socially. See, e.g., KAHAN, supra note 2, at 2-6. 
172. See Helen Nissenbaum & Yochai Benkler, Commons Based Peer Production and Virtue 
(May 26, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
173. Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto 2-3 (Jan. 2003), available at 
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.pdf. 
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performances; or in the upper-class way of hiring musicians. Market-based 
production depended on performance through presence. It provided 
opportunities for artists to live and perform locally. With the introduction of 
the phonograph, a particular relationship to played music was made 
possible, one that was more passive, relying on the high capital 
requirements of recording, copying, and distributing instantiations of 
recorded music. What developed was a concentrated industry, based on 
massive investments in preference formation, which crowded out some, but 
not all, of the sharing practices and many of the presence-performance- 
based markets, though not all of them (like jazz clubs, piano bars, or 
wedding bands). Conversely, as computers became more music capable and 
digital networks became a ubiquitously available distribution network, we 
saw the emergence of the present conflict over the regulation of cultural 
production-the law of copyright-between the twentieth-century 
industrial-model recording industry and the emerging amateur distribution 
systems coupled, at least according to supporters, to a reemergence of 
decentralized, relation-based markets for professional performance artists. 
C. Decentralized, Loosely Coupled Social Sharing Is an Economically 
Attractive Modality ofProduction 
The kind of social interaction typified by peer production like free 
software development, or by distributed computing, has remarkably market- 
like characteristics that make it particularly attractive as a social modality 
of production from the perspective of economic efficiency. The 
decentralization of these processes underlies agents' capacity to retain a 
great degree of individual autonomy within the social interaction. This 
autonomy-to choose to participate, to select opportunities for action, and 
to act when the participant wishes and in the fashion that she chooses-is 
central to the informational advantage of peer-production efforts over firms. 
Individual agents can act, by contributing labor or a unit of excess capacity, 
without the need for formalizatioql of their role or contribution, either for 
contracting or for managerial assignment. The modularity--of the 
incremental material contributions in shareable goods or of the work tasks 
in peer production-keeps individual actions discrete and fairly fine 
grained. This modularity again allows individuals to make decisions at the 
margin for each contribution or cluster of contributions, without 
undermining the whole and without incurring high social costs. These 
characteristics make the availability of resources-either labor or 
materials-relatively fluid. The weakness of the social relations, usually 
thought harmful to the sustainability of cooperation in the absence of 
property rights or managerial oversight, improves the fluidity of 
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deployment of goods and actions and bolsters the degree of agent autonomy 
in the relationship. 
This does not mean that individuals do not get emotionally and socially 
engaged in peer-production projects. They do. Nor does it mean that 
participants do not derive a sense of meaning and connectedness to others 
from participation. They do. It does, however, mean that the particular 
shape of this form of social production is relatively fluid, leaving 
tremendous room for autonomous individual action, in concert with others 
but not subject to them. The normative implications of these characteristics 
of peer production and large-scale social sharing behaviors are ambiguous. 
To a communitarian, the fluidity, the capacity to be involved in many 
projects at once, to ratchet one's participation up or down on an ad hoc 
basis, and to cabin the cooperative enterprise in one small or large 
compartment of one's life would render this mode relatively unattractive. 
But to liberals, libertarians, and postmodernists, various characteristics of 
this modality of production should be very congenial-it respects autonomy 
and allows for the creation of varied and diverse social relations of 
production, relatively free of the structuring effects of property rights and 
the distribution of wealth. Irrespective of one's position on the normative 
attractiveness of peer production as compared to Amish barn raisings, 
functionally it allows larger-scale participation by many more people, who 
can shift their efforts and contributions dynamically as need and interest 
arise and change. It is, in other words, likely to be more economically 
effective and efficient on a larger scale. 
The claim, then, is that phenomena I describe here and elsewhere- 
sharing of material shareable goods and peer production of software, 
information, and cultural goods more generally-resemble an ideal market 
in their social characteristics, but with social cues and motivations replacing 
prices as a means to generate information and motivate action. These 
phenomena rely on relatively impersonal, or loosely coupled, cooperation, 
are generally focused on a particular functional project, and are based on 
quite radically decentralized action. Their impersonality is what allows 
them to scale to very large groups, which can nonetheless maintain 
effective action, because intimacy, or even substantial familiarity, is highly 
limited by each individual's time, memory, and emotional capacities. Their 
relatively project-specific pattern is what allows for moderately impersonal 
exchange to suffice. Increasing the relational scope, which would require 
greater dedication from each individual, would make participants more 
vulnerable to each other and require greater stability and control over inputs 
and outputs. The absence of these stronger, "stickier" bonds makes these 
phenomena attractive as a modality of production because they allow 
greater flexibility and liquidity in the deployment of resources-whether 
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human or material-through these systems, more so than systems that 
depend on more centralized organizational infrastructures or that claim 
broader scope over the participation of participants. 
V. SOME CURRENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What are the policy implications of recognizing sharing as a sustainable 
and potentially efficient modality of economic production? Where is there 
now a policy battle between market-based, hierarchical organizations and 
social production through sharing? I will note here three areas with 
substantial implications for how our society produces, records, and 
communicates information, knowledge, and culture. 
A. Wireless Communications Regulation 
Perhaps the most counterintuitive policy shift, yet the one most likely to 
represent a fundamental change in our approach to provisioning a basic 
resource, is in the area of wireless communications. Early in the first decade 
and a half of radio, radios were relatively specialized but not sophisticated. 
Wireless communications capacity, such as existed, was therefore largely 
decentralized. Marconi operated large shore-to-ship stations on a monopoly 
service model, alongside much small-scale experimentation of the type that 
would come to be known as amateur radio. From World War I through the 
mid-1920s, improvements in the capacity of expensive transmitters and a 
series of strategic moves by the owners of the core patents in radio 
transmission-GE, RCA, AT&T, and Westinghouse-led by 1926 to the 
emergence of the industrial model of radio communications that typified the 
twentieth century. Radio came to be dominated by a small number of 
professional, commercial networks, based on high-capital-cost transmitters, 
supported by a regulatory framework tailored to making passive reception 
with simple receivers of commercial programming delivered through high- 
powered transmitters the primary model of radio for most Americans. This 
development crowded out the more widely distributed, local infrastructure 
of nonmarket broadcasting that blossomed in the first half of the 1920s in 
the United States.174 
174. A condensed version of this history can be found in Yochai Benkler, Overcoming 
Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV J.L. & 
TECH. 287, 301-14 (1998). The most comprehensive history on which this story is based is 1 ERIK 
BARNOuw, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN BABEL (1966). 
There are, needless to say, other historiographies of this period, some covered in Benkler, supra, 
at 298-301. The most distinctly different story, focusing more on the politics of grass-roots 
activism versus corporate corruption of the process and locating the origins of the system in the 
mid-1930s instead of the mid-1920s, is ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS 
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The industrial model, which assumes a large-scale capital investment in 
the core of the network and small-scale investments at the edges, optimized 
for receiving what is generated at the core, was imprinted on wireless 
communications systems both at the level of design and of regulatory 
theory. When mobile telephony came along, it replicated the same model, 
using relatively cheap handsets oriented toward an infrastructure-centric 
deployment of towers. The economic analysis of wireless communications 
adopted the same model, and it spent four decades criticizing the incumbent 
approach only on the basis that it inefficiently regulated the legal right to 
construct a wireless system by regulating spectrum use instead of creating a 
market in "spectrum use" rights.175 
By the time that legislatures in the United States and around the world 
had begun to accede to the wisdom of the economists' critique, however, 
the industrial model had been rendered obsolete by technology.176 In 
MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 
(1993). While McChesney's history is a gripping and important one, it is consistent, rather than 
inconsistent, with the hypothesis that the U.S. system was "tipped" by 1926. The power of the 
networks, which had captured the political process in the 1930s, is rooted in the business history 
of the first half of the 1920s. McChesney describes how that earlier moment, when we were 
locked into the regulated, concentrated commercial-industry model, worked itself out over almost 
a decade, rather than describing a moment of true openness and missed opportunity. 
The stakes of this interpretation for understanding Internet policy today are high. My 
version, the version I ascribe to Barnouw, requires an immediate focus on economic and technical 
structure while the technological and business organization of the Internet communications 
environment is still open. Time is of the essence, business structure and technology the objectives. 
McChesney's version would suggest that political action to attain regulatory control of an already 
embedded technical-business tructure is potentially effective. Time is then a little looser, and 
behavioral regulation of an otherwise unattractive business and technical framework is a feasible 
path of reform. 
175. The locus classicus of the economists' critique is R.H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). The best-worked-out version of how 
these property rights would look remains Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market 
Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum.: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 1499 (1969). While those works were deeply revolutionary for their time, and coherent with 
the then-prevailing technological-economic conditions and the state of the radio engineering 
discipline, the position that "spectrum" had to be "managed" by someone, and that that someone 
must be either the government or an owner of property rights defined in RF frequency bands, 
turns out, in hindsight, to have been technologically contingent rather than generally stable. 
176. For the full argument, see Benkler, supra note 174; and Yochai Benkler, Some 
Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2002). For an excellent 
overview of the intellectual history of this debate, a detailed explanation of the emerging business 
models around sharing radios, and a contribution to the institutional design necessary to make 
space for this change, see Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004). The policy implications of computationally 
intensive radios using wide bands were first raised, to my knowledge, by George Gilder, The New 
Rule of Wireless, FORBES ASAP, Mar. 29, 1993, at 96s, and by Paul Baran, Visions of the 21st 
Century Communications: Is the Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband Networks of the 
Future a Self Made Problem?, Keynote Address Before the Eighth Annual Conference on Next 
Generation Networks (Nov. 9, 1994), available at http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/Wireless 
cellular_radio/false_scarcity_baran_cngn94.transcript. Both statements focused on the potential 
abundance of spectrum and how it renders "spectrum management" obsolete. Eli Noam was the 
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particular, the declining cost of computation and the increasing 
sophistication of communications protocols among end-user devices in a 
network made possible new sharing-based solutions to the problem of how 
to allow users to communicate without wires. Now, instead of having a 
regulation-determined exclusive right to transmit, which may or may not 
itself be subject to market reallocation, it is possible to have a market in 
small-scale capital goods-smart radio equipment owned by individuals, 
much like automobiles and PCs-which embed in the devices the technical 
ability to share capacity and cooperate in the creation of capacity. These 
radios can cooperate by relaying each other's messages or by temporarily 
"lending" their antennae to neighbors to help them decipher messages of 
senders who are not entitled to exclusive use of the spectrum.'77 
Described in terms of this Essay, radio and computer technology has 
changed. Where once we had capital goods (radio transmitters and antenna 
towers) and consumer goods (radio receivers), now we have shareable 
goods (new radio "transceivers"). These transceivers have excess capacity 
to generate wireless transport capacity, which, like distributed computers 
and automobiles, their owners can share in order to produce wireless 
communications systems. 
The reasons that the owners share are relatively straightforward in this 
case. Users want to have wireless connectivity all the time, to be reachable 
and immediately available everywhere. But they do not actually want to 
communicate every few microseconds. They are therefore willing to 
first to point out that, even if one did not buy the idea that computationally intensive radios 
eliminated scarcity, they still rendered property rights in spectrum obsolete, and enabled instead a 
fluid, dynamic, real-time market in spectrum clearance rights. See Eli M. Noam, Taking the Next 
Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Open Spectrum Access, IEEE COMM. MAG., Dec. 1995, at 66; 
see also Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's 
Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 778-80 
(1998) (elaborating the author's earlier work). The argument that equipment markets based on a 
spectrum commons or free access to frequencies could replace the role planned for markets in 
spectrum property rights with computationally intensive equipment and sophisticated network 
sharing protocols, and would likely be more efficient even assuming that scarcity persists, is 
presented in Benkler, supra note 174. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE], and LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 
(2001), develop an argument relying on the parallel structure of innovation in the original Internet 
end-to-end design architecture and of open wireless networks that offers a rationale based on the 
innovation dynamic in support of the economic value of open wireless networks. David P. 
Reed, Why Spectrum Is Not Property: The Case for an Entirely New Regime of 
Wireless Communications Policy (Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.reed.com/Papers/openspec.html, and 
David P. Reed, Comments for FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force on Spectrum Policy (July 8, 
2002), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor pdf=pdf&id_document=6513202407 
[hereinafter Reed, Comments for FCC], crystallized the technical underpinnings and limitations of 
the idea that spectrum can be regarded as property. Reed's was the first substantial set of public 
comments in favor of a spectrum commons. 
177. For a reasonably accessible description of the various techniques, see Andrea J. 
Goldsmith & Stephen B. Wicker, Design Challenges for Energy-Constrained Ad Hoc Wireless 
Networks, IEEE WIRELESS COMM., Aug. 2002, at 8. 
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purchase and keep turned on equipment that makes them always available 
and instantaneously connected from wherever they are. Manufacturers, in 
turn, develop and adhere to standards that improve capacity and 
connectivity. Given that "cooperation gain" is the most promising source of 
better-than-linear capacity scaling for distributed wireless systems,178 these 
standards should gravitate toward interoperability and mutual awareness of 
requirements. Whether there are technically robust ways of "cheating" on a 
standard to improve performance by not cooperating is debatable,179 but it 
is doubtful that, even if achievable in principle, cheating could be done on a 
commercial scale without detection and in compliance with interoperability 
standards. Users, then, have incentives to keep systems turned on, 
manufacturers have incentives to "share nicely," and defections from 
sharing are likely to be reasonably identifiable. What remains for 
consideration in the regulatory process is how much, if any, background 
regulation of systems is necessary to constrain specifically strategic 
defections from cooperative standards, and in what flavors-as 
precertification rules, as liability rules, etc. This is a hard problem that will 
likely not be solved theoretically, but rather through practical 
experimentation with different regimes in different parts of the already- 
regulated spectrum. 
Cooperative, sharing-based wireless connectivity can emerge if it is not 
illegal for the vendors of wireless equipment to produce and sell the 
machines that let people share their capacity and help each other to 
communicate. The past few years have seen at first slow, and more recently 
quite dramatic, change in the extent to which the FCC and Congress have 
recognized this opportunity and begun to make regulatory space for its 
development. Indeed, in the past two years alone a major shift has occurred, 
and what have been called "commons-based" approaches to wireless 
178. See Benkler, supra note 176, at 44-47 (providing definition and underlying technical 
citations). The term "cooperation gain" was developed by David Reed, see Reed, Comments for 
FCC, supra note 176, to describe a concept similar to, but somewhat broader than, what is known 
as "diversity gain" in multi-user information theory. 
179. Compare Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses.: 
Opportunities and Dangers, in INTERCONNECTION A D THE INTERNET 49 (Gregory L. Rosston & 
David Waterman eds., 1997) (modeling defection in unlicensed wireless systems), with Timothy 
J. Shepard, Comments to the FCC Taskforce, http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi? 
nativeorpdf-=pdf&id_document=6513201206 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004), and Timothy J. 
Shepard, Additional Comments, http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor_.pdf= 
pdf&id_document=6513405081 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Shepard, who was the first 
theoretical engineer to build a workable model of municipal-level scalable networks in a mesh 
architecture, explains why adding power-the quintessential strategy that would lead to tragedy 
and require regulation-is not the only, and indeed not the most desirable, mechanism of dealing 
with increased power by antisocial neighbors. See Timothy Jason Shepard, Decentralized Channel 
Management in Scalable Multi-Hop Spread Spectrum Packet Radio Networks (1995) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, MIT) (on file with the MIT library). 
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communications policy have come to be seen as a legitimate, indeed a 
central, component of the FCC's wireless policy.180 We are beginning to see 
in this space the most prominent example of a system once entirely oriented 
toward improving the institutional conditions of market-based production of 
wireless transport capacity as functionality flows (connectivity minutes) 
now shifting to enable the emergence of a market in shareable goods (smart 
radios) designed to provision transport on a sharing model. 
B. Information, Knowledge, and Cultural Production Policy 
Another area of policy where sharing is coming into conflict with 
market- or firm-based production that is based on a particular regulatory 
environment is in cultural production.'18 The story of music that I told in 
Section IV.B is the paradigmatic case of the pressure that the ubiquity of 
networked computers places on our understanding of how information, 
knowledge, and culture are produced, of the potential these networks have 
for increasing the relative role of sharing systems in that production 
process, and of efforts to use law to squelch the technological conditions 
and practices of sharing and the social production of distribution. 
In many senses, it is odd to think of cultural production as an area that 
ever came to be thought of as "dominated," in any useful meaning of the 
word, by market production. As an analytic matter, music, films, and books 
are forms of information, public goods, and could not, even in principle, be 
provisioned efficiently by markets alone.182 As a practical matter, we have 
always relied heavily on organizational and institutional forms insulated 
from both state and markets to produce information, knowledge, and 
culture. That is what the university and academic freedom are centrally 
about. That is what underlies the heavy reliance of the arts on philanthropy 
and on a culture of esteem and status as crucial motivating forces. That is 
what public schools and libraries are about. Our understanding of 
information, knowledge, and culture as "public goods" in the formal 
180. See FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE COMMISSION (2002), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542Al.pdf; Michael K. 
Powell, Broadband Migration III: New Directions in Wireless Policy, Remarks at the Silicon 
Flatiron Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado at Boulder (Oct. 30, 2002), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp212.html. 
181. The conflict is brilliantly described and engaged in LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: 
How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY (2004); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); and SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, 
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001). 
182. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616-17 (1962). 
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economic sense should have immunized us from mistaking the presence of 
important market-based approaches for the whole, or even the core, of the 
story of information and cultural production. And yet, it does seem that our 
perception of where information generally, and culture in particular, comes 
from came to be dominated over the second half of the twentieth century by 
a vision of Hollywood and the recording industry. 
The rise of Hollywood and the recording industry is a happenstance of 
the twentieth-century economics of film and music recording and 
distribution. The relative capital intensity involved in recording, 
distribution, and production underlies the industrial structure of these 
industries. This structure, in turn, and the political force of its industries, 
underlies the steady but inexorable changes in copyright law, from a 
relatively brief period of statutory exclusivity over commercial distribution 
at the turn of the twentieth century to a broad, practically perpetual right 
over almost any use of copyrighted information, knowledge, or cultural 
materials by the close of that century. 
Against the background of the iconic role of movies and recorded 
music in framing how we understand our cultural production system, 
Napster emerged at the close of the century as the counter-icon of the 
technological shift that radically disrupted that model. In the legal battles 
that have followed, the industry has ever more virulently invoked the 
powers of the state to squelch the use of this technology and its attendant 
social-cultural attitudes. In these battles, the revolutionary effect of peer-to- 
peer technologies and of sharing as a modality of production-in the case 
of music, distribution, relevance, and accreditation-have been 
overshadowed.183 
Free software development, and peer production more generally, 
combine two features that make them the polar opposite of Hollywood and 
the recording industry. First, they decentralize the legal privilege to decide 
to act upon information resources in pursuit of information production 
projects. One needs no permission to participate in a peer-production 
project, to use any particular piece of software as an input, or to combine it 
with any other. Second, the capital costs necessary to obtain, rework, and 
communicate the products of one's work to others with whom one is 
cooperating in production are low and are already owned for a variety of 
reasons by the participants. Neither capital nor legal rights provide a 
condensation point for hierarchical or property-based relations. 
183. For an overview of the state of the music and film industries in the twentieth century, 
and of the battles since its closing years between the industrial producers and the emerging online 
technologies, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004). 
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The policy conflict between these modes of production has emerged in 
two domains. First, and more immediately tractable to policy, is the 
question of government procurement policy vis-a-vis free software. Led by 
Microsoft,184 some software producers who depend on copyright have 
fought a battle to persuade governments to eschew free software in their 
procurement policies, as against an opposite political move to embrace free 
software-whether as a method to lower government software costs, a 
development policy to allow local programmers to develop skills and 
opportunities in free software markets,"85 or a strategy to assure a diversity 
of sources for mission-critical applications.186 An understanding and 
appreciation of the ubiquity and stability of social-sharing-based production 
is important as an input into this debate. 
More complex is the debate over the industrial structure of cultural 
production, in particular music and movies. Unlike the peer-production 
enterprises I mention here, Napster and its successors, from Gnutella to 
KaZaa, are not involved in the creation of music. In what way, then, are 
Napster and KaZaa "productive"? In the same sense that the recording 
industry deems its role in stamping CDs, promoting them on radio stations, 
and placing them on distribution chain shelves to be productive. That is, 
they produce both the physical and informational aspects of the distribution 
system collaboratively, on a social sharing basis. This is what Eben Moglen 
has called anarchist distribution, which he claims has the perfectly plausible 
advantage that it puts the music people want into the hands of those who 
want it most, based on the six-degrees-of-separation principle.187 Jane's 
friends and friends of friends are more likely to know exactly what music 
would make her happy than are recording executives trying to predict 
184. See Dave Newbart, Microsoft CEO Take[s] Launch Break with the Sun-Times, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, June 1, 2001, at 57. According to Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer, 
The only thing we have a problem with is when the government funds open source 
work. Government funding should be for work that is available to everybody. Open 
source is not available to commercial companies. The way the license is written, if you 
use any open source software you have to make the rest of your software open source. 
If the government wants to put something in the public domain, it should. Linux is not 
in the public domain. Linux is a cancer that attaches itself in an intellectual property 
sense to everything it touches. That's the way that the license works. 
Id. 
185. See Open Source Initiative, Use of Free Software in Government Agencies, 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/bill-EngTrans.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (giving text of 
proposed Peruvian legislation). 
186. See PANEL ON OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE FOR HIGHEND COMPUTING, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT: DEVELOPING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE TO ADVANCE HIGH END COMPUTING 
(2000), http://www.itrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pres-oss- 11lsep00.pdf. 
187. See Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free Software and the Death of Proprietary 
Culture, Address at the University of Maine Law School's Fourth Annual Technology and Law 
Conference (June 29, 2003), available at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/maine- 
speech.html. 
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which song to place, on which station, and on which shelf, to expose her to 
exactly the music she is most likely to buy in a context where she would 
buy it. 
So KaZaa produces distribution of music on a sharing modality. 
Distribution is indeed a separate economic good from music creation, and 
yet was centrally tied to the way the production of music and movies has 
been paid for throughout the twentieth century. The ties were so close, in 
fact, that in displacing industrial distribution, peer-to-peer distribution is 
thought both by its critics and by some of its adherents to be likely to 
undermine the very possibility of industrial production of music. Now, 
there are some artists who welcomed this development, understanding that 
the model of production they were part of was industrial, and believing that 
artistic expression was being constrained by it.'88 But others were perfectly 
happy with industrial distribution and the millions of dollars that they 
reaped from it, or believed that they might one day reap. Certainly there are 
recording industry executives whose roles have no existence outside of the 
industrial organization of music production and distribution. 
Needless to say, it is not my purpose here to "solve" the question of 
peer-to-peer networks and their effect on the music industry. As free 
software has taught us, there is little doubt that social provisioning through 
sharing can at least partially displace market provisioning. We have no 
reason to believe that it could not, in principle, crowd that modality out 
entirely-despite the current ambiguity as to whether peer-to-peer sharing 
indeed crowds out CD sales.'89 Is there a future for sharing-based music 
distribution? Is the displacement of industrial distribution by sharing-based 
distribution necessarily the end of market-based music production? Much 
of the actual flow of revenue to artists-from performances and other 
sources-is stable even assuming a complete displacement of the CD 
market by peer-to-peer distribution, suggesting that there will still be room 
for musicians to play for their dinner. Perhaps there will be fewer 
millionaires. Perhaps fewer mediocre musicians with attractive physiques 
will be sold as "geniuses," and more good musicians will be heard than 
otherwise would have and will as a result be able to get paying gigs instead 
of waiting tables or "getting a job." In any event, no one seriously claims 
that the market in distribution cannot be sustained in a radically 
188. See, e.g., Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, SALON, June 14, 2000, 
http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/index.html; see also Future of Music Coalition, 
The Future of Music Manifesto, http://www.futureofmusic.org/manifesto (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004). 
189. See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: 
An Empirical Analysis (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing 
March2004.pdf. 
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decentralized mode. As long as songs-intrinsically public goods-are 
encoded in digital bits that are non-scarce, as long as users have computers 
that allow them temporarily to share their play lists and hard drives with 
others, sharing will be sustainable, indeed likely more efficient, as a means 
of distributing music. 
As for creation, it would be silly to think that music, a cultural form 
without which no human society has existed, will cease to be in our world 
because we shall abandon the industrial form it took for the blink of a 
historical eye that was the twentieth century. Music was not born with the 
phonograph, nor will it die with the peer-to-peer network. The terms of the 
debate, then, are about cultural policy, perhaps about industrial policy. Will 
we get the kind of music we want in this system, whoever "we" are? Will 
American recording companies continue to get the export revenue streams 
they currently enjoy? Will artists be able to live from making music? Some 
of these arguments are serious. Some are but a tempest in a monopoly-rent 
teapot. What is clear is that a technological change has rendered obsolete a 
particular mode of distributing information and culture. Distribution, which 
used to be the sole domain of market-based firms, can now be produced by 
decentralized networks of users, sharing with others instantiations of music 
they deem attractive, using equipment they own and generic network 
connections. That is, users combine public goods (songs) with shareable 
goods (storage media and bandwidth) to provision the core good that was 
the bread and butter of the traditional industrial producers of music. 
Policy is concerned now with whether and to what extent it should try 
to squelch this new modality of production to preserve the operating 
conditions of the old. Understanding the causes of the challenge suggests 
that three powerful elements will have to be, practically speaking, regulated 
away in order to preserve the old industrial structure. The newly emerging 
modality of production relies on (1) the most fundamental technical 
characteristics of digital communications networks-their flexibility and 
adaptability; (2) a technological-economic trend toward lower-cost, higher- 
capacity processors that has been a stable feature of the computer industry 
for four decades; and (3) the ubiquitous and deeply ingrained cultural 
practices and social-psychological mindsets that form the transactional 
framework for an enormous amount of productive activity in our society, 
on- and off-line: sharing. 
The practices of, and taste for, sharing are not epiphenomenal to the 
economy. They are not a hip new thing kids are doing, which will pass like 
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any fad.'90 They are as much a part of capillary production-"Jack, could 
you put the brown box on the high shelf?"-as the incentives of money and 
the contract and property systems are central to the arteries-"Allied Vans, 
could you move the brown box to the bedroom in California?" It is 
breathtaking to imagine that all this would be legislated away in order to 
preserve the margins of two industries with total revenues of seventy-six 
billion dollars a year'9g-slightly more than Verizon's annual revenue.192 
The solution must assume that peer-to-peer file sharing is here to stay and 
that attempting to stamp out flexible, adaptive, general-purpose personal 
computers and criminalize one of our most basic social-cultural practices 
will, and ought to, fail. Once we understand that, we can focus our energies 
on the range of solutions that have been suggested-from government 
funding'93 to tip jars and performancesl94-that aim at preserving the 
livelihood of artists, not the twentieth-century business model of industrial 
cultural production. 
C. Network Design for a Network of Shareable Goods 
Not all policy is legal. As Larry Lessig has taught so many of us so 
well, the architecture of "code" is also policy.'95 A large domain of 
communications policy operates at the level of network architecture, and 
the assumptions engineers make about what practices are socially 
sustainable inform their design choices. If engineers believe that people can 
be made to cooperate only through pricing, then where a network calls for 
190. On the centrality of sharing as a modality of cultural production on the Net and its 
conflict with the notion of "stealing" music, see Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing (Apr. 13, 
2004), available at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/sharing&stealing.pdf. 
191. See CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS, TABLE 1: ADVANCE SUMMARY 
STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/econ/ 
census02/advance/TABLE1.HTM (providing 2002 data for the motion picture and sound 
recording industries). 
192. See Verizon, Verizon's 2003 Interactive Annual Report, http://investor.verizon.com/ 
2003annual/financials/finnotes3.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (noting 2002 revenues of $67.3 
billion dollars). 
193. Two state-oriented solutions, based on taxing devices and remunerating artists and 
labels, are outlined in FISHER, supra note 183, at 199-258, and Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2003). 
194. Artists themselves seem focused on building on a variety of self-help mechanisms based 
on their relationships with fans, ranging from live performances to web-based distribution on a tip 
jar model. See the now-classic John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 
84, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html; and Love, supra 
note 188. The Future of Music Coalition, for example, provides artists with instructions on how to 
implement tip jars. See Future of Music Coalition, How Can Musicians and Artists Collect Real 
Money in an "Electronic Tip Jar"?, http://www.futureofmusic.org/tipjars/index.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). 
195. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 176. 
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cooperation, they will seek to implement a pricing mechanism. If they 
believed that social sharing was possible and sustainable, they could build 
networks to assume that possibility and to facilitate social sharing. The 
actual practice of Internet design has been ambivalent on this question. The 
basic Internet protocol design itself does not make it possible to prioritize 
traffic using pricing. It relies exclusively, at the transmission control 
protocol layer-that is, at the congestion-control mechanism--on best 
efforts and undifferentiated service. Predictions that the Internet would 
therefore melt down were followed by assiduous development of pricing 
schemes for traffic prioritization at the packet level.196 
And yet, per-packet pricing has not been implemented, and the Internet 
has not melted down. Users have not adopted any of the more or less 
sophisticated pricing schemes proposed over the past decade or more. 
Instead, ever more demanding applications for real-time streaming, and 
even the most latency-sensitive of applications-like voice-over-Internet 
protocol (VoIP)-have begun to be implemented without introducing 
pricing. I suggest that this may be occurring because communicating 
through the Internet systematically involves using shareable goods. When 
this is so, algorithms designed to let people share their capacity and balance 
load among units that have overcapacity offer a better solution than 
algorithms designed to enable the millions of transactions necessary to 
achieve a comparably efficient network service. Demand for units with 
overcapacity increases capacity over time, and sharing and load balancing 
allocate extant capacity in the short term. Let me illustrate with one VoIP 
application, which makes clear the possibilities of generalized, impersonal 
social exchange as a means of provisioning resources over a price- 
insensitive network made of shareable goods. 
The application is Skype.197 It is proprietary software provided by the 
makers of KaZaa, currently the most popular peer-to-peer music-sharing 
platform.198 There are no published performance studies of this network 
196. See F.P. Kelly et al., Rate Control for Communications Networks. Shadow Prices, 
Proportional Fairness, and Stability, 49 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC'Y 237 (1998); Jeffrey K. 
MacKie-Mason & Hal Varian, Economic FAQs About the Internet, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 
1994, at 75 (1994); Scott Shenker et al., Pricing in Computer Networks: Reshaping the Research 
Agenda, 20 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183 (1996); Andrew Odlyzko, Paris Metro Pricing for the Internet 
(1997), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/paris.metro.pricing.pdf 
197. Skype, http://www.skype.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
198. See Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution, 
http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Clay Shirky, PCs 
are the Dark Matter of the Internet, http://www.shirky.com/writings/dark_matter.html (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). Skype runs on a structured ecentralized peer-to-peer network on the model of 
KaZaa. The first major peer-to-peer network, Napster, relied on a centralized server to store 
information about which peer had what music. While peers then communicated irectly with each 
other and downloaded music from one another's computers from one end of the network to 
another, no peer could communicate directly with another without first identifying the relevant 
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relative to the telephone network and other PC-to-PC voice-telephony-over- 
Internet applications. As of early 2004, however, while still in beta testing, 
the software was downloaded by over ten million users, and used at any one 
time by over 300,000. Anecdotally the software seems to function well, 
offering voice quality and reliability-again, anecdotally--on par with 
cordless phones, if not quite plain old telephone service. What is fascinating 
about this application, if it proves capable of scaling technically (leaving 
the business model to one side),'99 is that it relies on a peer-to-peer network. 
The capacity used to deliver the service is purely combined from capacity- 
generating components that have the characteristics of shareable goods. 
Users put these components into service for reasons other than voice-grade 
telephony, but Skype allows them to share their overcapacity so as to co- 
provision a telephony system. In an always-on, or even mostly-on, universe, 
where PCs have large amounts of unused memory and bandwidth and a 
client like Skype's runs in the background, taking up proportionally 
miniscule amounts of CPU power, bandwidth, and electricity, there will be 
little need to provide incentives to avoid shirking. Every user's interest in 
being reachable by her friends should provide enough incentive to keep her 
client on and connected. Except for the rare individuals who speak for more 
hours than they do not in any given twenty-four-hour period, and who are 
capable of using their computer to its capacity while at the same time 
talking, so that they take resources from the VoIP network without 
contributing at least as much back into it of their own excess processing, 
caching, and bandwidth capacities, the system capacity should scale well 
from the perspective of the willingness of participants to contribute as much 
as they take or more. 
other by reference to a central listing. This made the communications protocol simple to design 
and execute, but the system vulnerable to attack and failure. The particular attack on that server 
was legal action, and the failure was a court-ordered closure. But the weakness was 
architectural-there was a single point of attack that could bring the system down. The response 
of the community of technology developers was to treat the legal attack like any other failure and 
to design around it. The result was Gnutella, and a class of approaches to peer-to-peer network 
design that avoided creating a center that would be vulnerable to attack but that had very high 
overhead, because it had no central clearing point detailing who had what information stored 
where. FastTrack, with its best-known clients Morpheus and KaZaa, introduced Supernodes, 
which added structure to the network of peers but still was insufficiently centralized to suffer the 
failure of Napster. The software dynamically assigns to users "Supernode" status based on their 
available resources, and instead of every node telling every other node everything it has and 
everything it wants, every node tells these things to its nearest Supernode, and Supernodes tell 
each other, keeping network traffic and information overhead low while retaining redundancy, 
flexibility in the distribution of the location of information, load balancing among nodes with 
more or less free capacity, and flexible rerouting around points of failure. The result is a system 
that is much more popular than Napster was, but offers no single point of failure for attack. 
199. We can afford to leave the business model aside because Skype is an architecture and 
software, not a physical network. It hence could, in principle, be developed on a free software 
model should one company or another fail. 
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The policy point of the Skype story is fairly simple. VolP is one of the 
most demanding applications, insofar as quality-of-service assurance is 
concerned, because we have such remarkably low tolerance for latency in 
voice communications. VoIP has therefore been the primary excuse for 
schemes aimed at implementing pricing at the transmission control protocol 
level so as to manage congestion. Skype suggests that pricing is 
unnecessary if the machinery necessary for VoIP is sufficiently widespread 
and is a shareable good. PCs and, increasingly, broadband connections in 
the advanced economies indeed have the core characteristics of shareable 
goods. They are provisioned by individuals for their individual use in 
lumpy units that mostly exhibit substantial overcapacity. Given that 
requirements for human voice communications are limited by human 
capacity to comprehend and engage in real-time communications, but 
capacity is generated by demand for a much wider host of applications, 
most of them allowing asynchronous use, the lumpiness of these units 
should persist. Given also that one needs to have such an overcapacity- 
generating good or resource to participate in PC-to-PC communications in 
the first place, demand will outstrip capacity only in the very unlikely case 
that the total demand for capacity by all owners of units systematically 
outstrips total capacity of all units put in place by owners, even though the 
units are put in service only if they indeed provide some threshold capacity 
that equals or exceeds the requirements of the owner of the unit. This is not 
theoretically impossible,200 but is probabilistically insignificant. In parallel 
to my observations about open wireless networks, if the devices necessary 
to take advantage of a functionality have the characteristics of shareable 
goods, it is possible that a market in capacity-generating units with 
overcapacity, sold on a per-unit basis, coupled with a technical platform 
that allows them to share their overcapacity and balance the load among 
units, will increase capacity better than an approach that assumes a fixed 
capacity provisioned through a market in capacity flows. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has two primary goals. The particular goal is to identify a 
class of resources or goods that are amenable to being shared within social 
sharing systems rather than allocated through markets. The general goal is 
to suggest that the particular observation, together with a growing body of 
literature on social norms, social capital, common property regimes, and 
200. The units meet prior demand exactly-Skype adds exactly so much demand that it 
overwhelms the system capacity, but not enough added demand to make enough people buy 
enough new units with even greater overcapacity to achieve sufficient total capacity in the new 
state. 
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the emergence of peer production, outlines the contours of social sharing 
as a third mode of organizing economic production, alongside markets and 
the state. 
I suggest in this Essay that there is a class of material resources or 
goods that are lumpy and of medium granularity. These goods exhibit 
systematic overcapacity, which is often subject to sharing practices. 
Lumpiness is a technologically determined characteristic of these resources. 
Granularity is a function of technology and the extant demand and wealth in 
a society. It describes the divergence between the package size of a unit of a 
good capable of producing functionality and the demand individuals have 
for that functionality. Mid-grained lumpy goods are large enough so that 
each unit has systematically more capacity than one person requires over 
the lifetime of the good, and small enough that one person can justify 
putting a unit into operation to serve his demand for the functionality over 
the lifetime of the unit, given his ability and willingness to pay. One could 
think of them as consumption goods that for technical reasons come 
bundled with capital goods as a byproduct. Such units will generally have 
an overcapacity on an aggregate basis, in the sense that they will be able to 
deliver more functionality over their lifetime than the owners of units will 
demand in that time period. Goods with these characteristics will 
systematically represent a pool of potentially idled physical-capital 
resources. The problem is whether and how these idle resources will come 
to be used when their owners do not demand their capacity. 
Information and transaction costs, and the practical diversity of 
individual motivations, limit the efficacy of secondary markets to harness 
this excess capacity. The comparative efficiency of social sharing systems 
and secondary markets is a context-specific, empirical matter, but one can 
generalize that markets (1) will have higher marginal transaction costs per 
transaction, because social exchanges can operate with systematically 
fuzzier boundaries than market transactions require if they are to be 
efficient; (2) will have less information, organized in a more formally 
computable form, at the expense of more textured, detailed information that 
can be computed in less formal, culturally transmitted modalities; and (3) 
may, by using pricing, crowd out social-psychological rewards that would 
elicit sharing patterns. We can predict that sharing is likely to be more 
efficient than markets when shareable goods are widely owned and have 
only small amounts of excess capacity per unit, relative to the total amount 
of capacity necessary to produce an economically valuable output. In those 
cases, the number of transactions necessary to accumulate the excess 
capacity into a usable amount of functionality, on the one hand, and the 
likely low price that small incremental contributions will command, on the 
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other, suggest that both transaction costs and the crowding-out effect will 
be substantial if a secondary market is used in these situations. 
More generally, I suggest that shareable goods are but one instance of a 
broader phenomenon outlined by the literature on social norms, social 
capital, and, most directly, common property regimes. Social production 
and exchange comprises a third system of production, a class of solutions to 
production problems that is separate from, and can complement or 
substitute for, the two more commonly studied systems: markets-through 
both the price system and the firm-and the state. The relative salience of 
social production or sharing as an economic phenomenon is technology 
dependent. In particular, the form of sharing that we observe today 
occurring in information and communications production-relatively 
impersonal, project- or function-specific, radically decentralized 
cooperation--depends on the technologically contingent physical-capital 
requirements for effective action. As capital requirements have declined 
and access to the relevant capital goods has become widely disseminated in 
advanced economies, the scope of sharing as a modality of production has 
increased. This requires that we invest greater effort in further research into 
the internal dynamics of social sharing and exchange systems, focused not 
so much on their characteristics as modes of social reproduction as on their 
characteristics as transactional frameworks and modes of economic 
production. The anthropology of gift and economic anthropology literature, 
the sociology and economics of reciprocity, and the literature on common 
property regimes seem particularly valuable sources for further exploration 
of these modes of cooperation. 
It is crucial that we understand this fundamental change in the material 
conditions of production in the networked information economy. We find 
ourselves faced with policy and design questions that assume that the role 
of market production is fixed, rather than technologically contingent. We 
observe in many contexts policy choices and design impulses that take 
assumptions appropriate to the capital requirements of industrial economies 
and try to force behavior in the networked information economy into the 
social and market behavioral patterns that were appropriate for that 
technological stage and capital structure, rather than for the one we live in 
today. We must learn instead how to adjust our expectations, assumptions, 
and, ultimately, policy prescriptions to accommodate the emerging 
importance of social relations in general, and sharing in particular, as a 
modality of economic production. 
